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Abstract
Jekyll and Hyde paradoxes refer to the fact that people sometimes behave morally in
certain situations but then behave immorally (or, at least, less morally) under conditions that
differ for reasons that seem morally irrelevant. Observational and experimental studies confirm
the economic and social importance of these phenomena, which are inconsistent both with
rational self-interest as well as with theories that add stable moral preferences. This paper
presents a theory that reconciles various of these phenomena, including the depressing effects on
moral behavior of experimentally introducing options to take the earnings of others, to delegate
decisions and to remain ignorant of the consequences of one’s decision, as well as rewarding and
punishing others for uncontrollable luck. The theory introduces the concept of virtue preferences,
which together with a model combining moral salience, fairness and altruism, explain not only
these paradoxes but also classic findings on reciprocity. The results of an experiment that tests
the theory out-of-sample prove consistent with the theoretical predictions.
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1. Introduction
Companies hire consulting firms to recommend or carry out the firing of their employees,
although the companies could implement the firings themselves and save the consulting fees. In
the lead-up to the 2007-08 financial crisis, lenders, who were formerly prudent, chose to avoid
documenting applicants’ incomes. In the early 2000s, CEOs of troubled firms like Enron and
Worldcom professed ignorance of the dubious accounting practices at their companies. An
extensive literature in economics on reciprocity shows people reward good behavior and punish
bad behavior, but more recent research finds that delegating decisions or remaining willfully
ignorant, as in the above examples, sometimes enables decision-makers to avoid accountability.
Moreover, even when decision-makers are held accountable, other research shows that such
reckoning is not always limited to actual choices: people reward or punish politicians and CEOs
not only for their good or bad choices but sometimes also for uncontrollable luck.
Various explanations can be offered for these “anomalies,” such as social image
concerns, specialization, changes in regulatory regimes, fear of prosecution, risk preferences, or
other (strategically) self-interested considerations. But the results of more recent laboratory and
field experiments that constitute experimental renditions of these paradoxes demonstrate their
robustness to careful controls. Diverse theories have been designed to explain many of the
“classic” findings from decades of research based on a combination of self-interest and stable
social preferences. The more recent anomalies, however, point to inconsistencies, not only with
unadulterated self-interest, but also with the prevailing social preference theories. For instance,
self-interested individuals should take the selfish actions, e.g., firing employees themselves or
revealing information that identifies the most self-serving choice, and morally motivated
decision-makers should take the moral actions, e.g., not firing the employees or revealing
information that identifies the most moral action, but neither selfish nor moral types should
delegate decisions or avoid information. Moreover, social preference theories that incorporate
reciprocal motives to sanction, i.e., to reward or punish, do not predict or explain the effects cited
above on sanctioning behavior involving delegation, willful ignorance or uncontrollable luck.
This paper presents a theory of moral salience, conditional altruism and virtue
preferences that accounts for various classic as well as more recent anomalous findings on moral
preferences. It introduces a theory of sanctioning called virtue preferences and integrates it into
the theory of allocative preferences introduced in the paper, “Moral Salience and Conditional
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Altruism: Reconciling Jekyll and Hyde Paradoxes” (henceforth Konow, 2022). It applies the
theory to additional stylized facts of experiments not covered in the other paper and reports the
results of an original experiment that tests and finds support for the theory out-of-sample. The
theory is related to the oldest school of thought in Western moral philosophy, virtue ethics. With
reference to this school, Ashraf and Bandiera (2017) explore how altruistic acts affect altruistic
capital, and Konow and Earley (2008) discuss the relationship between virtue and happiness. The
current theory relates to other features of virtue ethics, including its claims of moral pluralism
(i.e., the existence of multiple moral principles), context-dependent morality, and a concern for
virtues.
The theory is formulated here to address certain types of decisions. Although strategic
decision-making is obviously economically important (and reference will sometimes be made to
results on such decisions), formally I focus on the unilateral choices of a decision-maker, or
agent, acting on a passive person, or patient. There are several reasons for this focus: it helps
zero in on moral motives while avoiding the potentially confounding effects of strategic selfinterest, it facilitates the parallel development of a simple model and experimental design to test
the model, and it relates to experimental and observational evidence on such decisions from a
large (although not unwieldy) literature. Anonymous donations to charities provide an example
from the field of the kind of decisions considered. An example from the laboratory is the dictator
game: in one variation on this design, two subjects are endowed with fixed sums of money, and
the subject with a larger endowment, the dictator, may anonymously transfer amounts to the
subject with a smaller endowment, the recipient, who has no recourse. An anomaly discussed in
Konow (2022) and later in this paper is the “taking effect:” in a standard dictator game, the
dictator may only transfer a non-negative amount to the recipient, but if options to take from the
recipient are added to an otherwise equivalent treatment, there is a reduction in the fraction of
dictators who give and in the average transfer among those who give. This taking effect is
inconsistent with stable moral preferences: a dictator, who is selfless enough to give in the
standard case, should give the same amount, if taking is permitted.
Consider this rough sketch of the theory, beginning with the framework introduced in
Konow (2022). In addition to material utility, the agent is assumed to have allocative
preferences, specifically, called conditional altruism, which consists of fairness preferences and
altruism. Fairness preferences represent the disutility to the agent of the patient receiving more or
2

less than the patient’s fair payoff. Altruism is (in the case of most agents) the utility from
transferring an amount to the patient, or, where relevant, the agent’s disutility of taking from the
patient. Note that, although suitable for the contexts considered here, these simple preferences
are not presumed to exhaust all moral preferences. Allocative preferences are weighted by moral
salience, which represents the prominence of moral preferences in the agent’s utility function.
Moral salience is a function of the decision context, i.e., of the agent’s set of choices and
information about the choices. This weight increases with moral context, e.g., if the agent is
permitted to share more money, and decreases with non-moral context, e.g., if the agent is
permitted to take more money from the patient. The obvious implication of these assumptions is
consistent with the taking effect described above: adding taking options reduces the prominence
of, and weight on, moral preferences and, therefore, dictator giving.
This paper extends this framework by introducing virtue preferences, which represent the
desire to reward or punish another beyond what is called for by fairness alone. For concreteness,
think again of the dictator game described above but with an additional second, unannounced
stage involving an anonymous allocator. In contrast to the first stage in which the dictator is a
stakeholder, whose own earnings are affected by his or her decision, in this second stage the
allocator is a third-party spectator, who receives a fixed payment to distribute an additional sum
of money between the dictator and the recipient from the first stage. Virtue preferences are
incorporated as an argument in fairness preferences, in this case, those of the spectator, which
adjusts the payoff to the dictator that minimizes inequity aversion for the spectator, upwards in
the case of rewarding the dictator and downwards in the case of punishing the dictator. The ideal
adjustment is a function of both the action and intrinsic motivation of the dictator. That is, in this
application, the agent’s desire to sanction is not a function of the dictator’s intrinsic motivation
alone, if that motivation is not accompanied by action on the part of the dictator. So, a generous
or selfish dictator is not rewarded or punished, respectively, merely for his or her moral
preferences. It is also not a function of the dictator’s action alone. To the latter point, consider a
given dictator transfer, say of $8, in the standard game without taking options. That same dictator
is predicted to transfer less, if taking options are added, because of reduced moral salience. Thus,
a dictator who transfers $8 in the treatment with taking signals greater intrinsic generosity than
the one who transfers $8 in the standard treatment and is predicted, therefore, to be treated more
favorably by a spectator. The ideal sanction, therefore, is a function of both the action and what it
3

conveys in the given context about the strength of the dictator’s intrinsic moral motivation.
Section 2 presents the theory with especial attention to virtue preferences, which is then
applied to classic results on reciprocity in section 3 and to the anomaly of outcome bias in
section 4. Section 5 applies the theory to an experiment similar to the scenario just described that
tests the theory out-of-sample and relates the results to the taking effect and to variations in
sanctioning with taking options. The next two sections address two types of norm avoidance,
viz., willful ignorance in section 6 and delegation in section 7, and propose explanations for
stakeholder allocations and norm avoidance and for third party sanctions. Section 8 discusses
briefly a different type of moral salience called point salience, and section 9 concludes.

2. Theory
This section presents the general theory of moral salience, conditional altruism and virtue
preferences. As moral salience and conditional altruism are described in detail in Konow (2022),
I refer the reader to that paper for a more in-depth treatment and discuss them more succinctly
here, focusing attention on the introduction of virtue preferences and their integration into the
general model.
The agent may choose an action, x, from the set of available actions, 𝑋𝑋, e.g., such as

dictator’s transfer to a recipient or a donor’s gift to a charity. The agent’s decision might also be
impacted by other potentially morally relevant information, e.g., knowledge of a recipient’s
endowment, y, as well as other elements of the set of information related to the decision, 𝑌𝑌.

Together, 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 form the decision context, 𝐶𝐶, which may be partitioned in a different manner

into moral context, 𝐶𝐶+ , and non-moral context, 𝐶𝐶− . There are measures on these subsets, 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ),
whereby the moral measure is denoted 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶+ ), and the non-moral measure is denoted 𝑛𝑛 =
𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶− ). Moral salience, 𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 𝑛𝑛), is the weight applied to the agent’s moral preferences and is a
function of the measures of moral and non-moral context, viz., 𝜎𝜎 is increasing in 𝑝𝑝 and

decreasing in 𝑛𝑛. In general, moral salience is decreasing in factors that increase the perceived

separation between the agent’s choice and the moral consequences of that choice on the patient.
In the taking game, for example, expanding opportunities to give increases moral context, 𝐶𝐶+ , its

measure, 𝑝𝑝, and, therefore, moral salience, i.e., it increases the weight on moral preferences.
Conversely, expanding opportunities to take increases non-moral context, 𝐶𝐶− , increases its

measure, 𝑛𝑛, and, therefore, decreases moral salience. Moral salience is a type of set salience,
4

which is a function of measures on subsets and captures the tendency for the subset with smaller
measure to have disproportionate prominence relative to the contrasting subset with larger
measure. This is distinct from moral point salience, which relates to elements of sets and is
discussed in section 8.
Moral salience maps the moral and non-moral measures of the decision context into the
half-open unit interval, 𝜎𝜎: ℝ2+ → (0,1], whereby I assume that 𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 0) > 0, 𝑝𝑝 > 0; 𝜎𝜎(0, 𝑛𝑛) ≥
0, 𝑛𝑛 > 0; and that 𝜎𝜎(𝑝𝑝, 𝑛𝑛) is twice continuously differentiable with
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

𝑛𝑛>0

𝜕𝜕2 𝜎𝜎

> 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝2 �

𝑛𝑛>0

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

< 0, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�
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𝜕𝜕2 𝜎𝜎
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𝑝𝑝>0

> 0.

𝑝𝑝

A convenient specification that captures the assumed relationships is the ratio 𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛. Further, many
contexts contain baseline moral salience, i.e., fixed moral considerations activated by being in

certain situations, such as being a dictator in a dictator game. This baseline salience is denoted
𝜎𝜎� ∈ [0,1) and leads to the following specification for moral salience:
𝑝𝑝

𝜎𝜎 = (1 − 𝜎𝜎�) ∙ 𝑝𝑝+𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎�.

For this ratio, I additionally assume 𝑝𝑝 > 0 guaranteeing that 𝜎𝜎 > 0. The proposed conditions

capture the tendency for the subset with smaller measure to have disproportionate prominence as
well as a further property: the marginal salience of the first addition of moral context is greater
than that of the second, i.e., moral salience increases at a decreasing rate; conversely, the effect
of the first addition of non-moral context is greater than the second, i.e., moral salience decreases
at a decreasing rate. For example, allowing a dictator to take $2 from a recipient reduces moral
salience more than allowing the dictator to take only $1, but the reduction in salience occasioned
by the first dollar of taking is greater than that of the second.
Moral salience is a weight applied to moral preferences, here using the model of
conditional altruism. This model has three components: material utility and two moral motives,
fairness and altruism. Material utility, 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 ), is assumed to be a twice continuously

differentiable function of the agent’s material allocation, 𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 , whereby 𝑢𝑢(0) = 0, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 > 0,
𝑎𝑎

2
and 𝜕𝜕 𝑢𝑢�𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 2 ≤ 0. Fairness, 𝑓𝑓�𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 − 𝜂𝜂�, captures the disutility experienced by the agent, as the
𝑎𝑎

patient’s allocation, 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 , differs from the fair allocation to the patient or so-called entitlement, 𝜂𝜂.

This term is strictly concave with a maximum where 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 = 𝜂𝜂, viz., 𝑓𝑓(0) = 0,
5

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ∙ 𝑤𝑤 < 0 for

𝑤𝑤 ≡ 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 − 𝜂𝜂 ≠ 0, and

𝜕𝜕 2 𝑓𝑓�
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 2 < 0. A fairness coefficient, 𝜙𝜙 > 0, which captures differences

across agents in the strength of their fairness preferences and is applied to 𝑓𝑓 to form 𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 − 𝜂𝜂).

Altruism is a twice continuously differentiable function, 𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼), of the amount given or taken
by the agent, x, and an altruism coefficient, 𝛼𝛼, where 𝑔𝑔(0, 𝛼𝛼) = 0,

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ⋛ 0 as 𝛼𝛼 ⋛ 0,

𝜕𝜕 2 𝑔𝑔�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑔𝑔�
<
0,
∙
𝑥𝑥
>
0
for
𝑥𝑥
≠
0,
and
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼 > 0. Specifically, agents differ
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 2

according to the value of their altruism coefficient, 𝛼𝛼, and can be categorized as altruistic, 𝛼𝛼 > 0,

selfish, 𝛼𝛼 = 0, or spiteful, 𝛼𝛼 < 0, and the slope of 𝑔𝑔 is increasing in 𝛼𝛼. Note that this resembles

warm glow, when 𝛼𝛼 > 0 and 𝑥𝑥 > 0 (e.g., Andreoni, 1989), but it also encompasses self-interest,

spite and taking (i.e., 𝑥𝑥 < 0). Altruism, in this model, is personal and unlike pure altruism in two
senses. First, it is a function solely of that part of the patient’s allocation that can be attributed to
a personal choice of the agent, e.g., a dictator transfer to or from a recipient, and not of the

patient’s total allocation. Second, it is personal in the sense of applying to partial relationships,
i.e., to agent-patient relationships but not to impartial third-party, or spectator, decisions.
Assuming additively separable utility and weighting fairness and altruism by moral
salience, the utility of the agent, 𝑈𝑈, is
(1)

𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓(𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼).

We will examine several variations on the dictator game described in the introduction, so note
that (1) may, in this case, be written
(2)

𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼),

where X is the endowment of the dictator, x the dictator’s transfer to the recipient such that 𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 =
𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥, and Y the recipient’s endowment such that 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 = 𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥. Below I mention only briefly the
most important additional assumptions about this model and refer the reader to Konow (2022)
for more detailed discussion.
Context enters into the theory in a second way in addition to moral salience, namely,
through the entitlement. A substantial experimental literature demonstrates that distributive goals
can correspond to different norms or combinations of norms depending on the decision context.
For instance, efficiency is relevant when total surplus can vary, equity (i.e., proportionality)
contributions chosen by individuals differ, need where there is information about basic needs,
and equality by default when morally relevant information about other norms is lacking (see
6

Konow, 2003, and Konow, Saijo and Akai, 2020). I discuss plausible justifications for different
entitlements in the various experiments treated based on lessons from these stakeholder and
spectator decisions. The latter, in particular, provide information on norms that, compared to the
former, is undistorted by self-interested bias and by noise caused by individual differences in the
degree of self-interest (see Konow, 2005, 2009). In cases involving simple dictator decisions
over fixed sums, the entitlement is assumed fixed. Although theoretical claims do not generally
depend on this, I also assume it reduces to equal splits in such games, both for concreteness and
for consistency with evidence on spectator decisions from such experiments.
When uncertainty is involved, I assume agents are expected utility maximizers. I also
assume that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝛼𝛼, 𝜙𝜙) > 0, i.e., fairer agents are, on average, more altruistic. Although not

necessary to explain most allocative behavior, it is a reasonable assumption that later proves
useful for certain claims involving virtue preferences. Konow (2022) describes in detail other
assumptions that ensure the model is consistent with intuition and stylized results from many
experiments, including that, in the standard dictator game, some dictators act selfishly, and that
minimally fair, spiteful, and super-fair dictators (i.e., ones who transfer more than a fair share)
are all minorities. 1 Here I summarize briefly some claims, which are stated and discussed in
greater detail in that paper, identifying them by their theorem numbers there. The optimal
transfer is increasing in 𝜎𝜎, 𝛼𝛼, 𝜂𝜂, and 𝜙𝜙, except for being decreasing in 𝜙𝜙 with super-fair agents

(2.1, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.3, respectively). The optimal transfer is decreasing in the measure of non-

moral context, 𝑛𝑛, and, assuming the optimal transfer is weakly convex in 𝜎𝜎, is strictly convex in
𝑛𝑛 (2.2). This last claim is consistent with empirical results presented in Konow (2022) and is
important for the focus of that paper and this paper on variation in 𝑛𝑛.

The utility function presented thus far is, in philosophical terms, entirely consequentialist,

i.e., it represents preferences over outcomes or the consequences of decisions. Material utility
reflects the material allocation of the agent. Conditional altruism, captured by fairness and
altruism, are allocative preferences with respect to the fair transfer and the agent’s endowment,
1

Formally, the assumptions are as follows: 𝜙𝜙 is distributed according to the cdf Φ(𝜙𝜙), which has support [𝜙𝜙, 𝜙𝜙]

with 0 < 𝜙𝜙 < 𝜙𝜙 < ∞ and 0 < Φ �𝜙𝜙� < 0.5, 𝛼𝛼 is distributed according to the cdf Α(𝛼𝛼), which has support [𝛼𝛼, 𝛼𝛼]
𝛼𝛼

with −∞ < 𝛼𝛼 < 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < ∞, Α(0) < 0.5 < Α(𝛼𝛼) − Α(0), ∫𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼 𝜌𝜌(𝛼𝛼)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 > 0 where 𝜌𝜌(𝛼𝛼) is the probability density

function of 𝛼𝛼, and 0 < 𝛼𝛼 ∗ < 𝛼𝛼 and 0 < Α(𝛼𝛼) − Α(𝛼𝛼 ∗ ) < 0.5 where 𝜎𝜎 ∗ is the level of salience in the standard
dictator game and 𝛼𝛼 ∗ = {𝛼𝛼|𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋 − 𝜂𝜂) = 𝜎𝜎 ∗ 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼′(𝛼𝛼𝜂𝜂)}. Finally, for even the most spiteful dictator (with 𝛼𝛼),
𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔′ (𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 ∗ ) > −𝜙𝜙𝑓𝑓 ′ (𝜙𝜙(𝑌𝑌 + 𝑥𝑥 ∗ − 𝜂𝜂)), where 𝑥𝑥 ∗ is the optimal transfer in the standard dictator game.
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respectively. Now I introduce virtue preferences, which represent an additional nonconsequentialist moral motive, viz., to sanction, that is, to reward or punish others. 2
Most theoretical accounts of sanctioning are reciprocity theories, e.g., Charness and
Rabin (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Rabin (1993), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004). These theories formulate a motive to reward or punish others based on their so-called
intentions. Good or bad intentions are inferred based on both others’ (expected) choices and their
available choice set. For example, the standard formulation considers whether the expected
consequences of another’s action exceed or fall short of some “fair” benchmark, whereby the
benchmark is defined relative to the other’s available choice set. An alternative approach is to
formulate this motive with respect to moral types. Levine (1998) introduced such a model in
which the sanctioning motive depends jointly on the altruism (or spite) of both the agent and the
patient. In his model, an agent might be altruistic or spiteful but is more altruistic (spiteful)
toward a more altruistic (spiteful) patient.
Virtue preferences incorporate core feature of virtue ethics, which is the oldest school in
Western moral philosophy. Its advocates span millennia and include Aristotle (1925), Adam
Smith (1759), and Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (1993). It should be noted that there are
different schools of thought within virtue ethics, but the theoretical concepts presented here are
variations on common positions that can be found in that branch of ethics. Morality is viewed as
pluralistic, i.e., consisting of multiple principles and preferences, whereby in the present case of
allocative preferences, these constitute fairness and altruism. 3 As interpreted in the present
theory, a virtue is a willingness to act on moral principles for the benefit of others, e.g., to be fair
or altruistic to others, that is actually acted on. This differs from the approaches reviewed above
in subtle but important ways. Reciprocity theories depend solely on consequences or intended
consequences, but not so with virtue, which depends on moral motivation. Virtue shares with the
moral types approach its link to moral preferences, but it is also distinct in several ways. First,
moral preferences must be realized in action, and, unlike the moral types approach, the relevant
metric is behavioral and not the latent variable of moral preferences. Second, and in a related

2
Although we do not explore this aspect here, in a dynamic framework, virtue preferences might serve to undergird
virtue itself, indeed, Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2014) find that punishment is a critical force that sustains the favorable
effects of increased moral salience on cooperation.
3
In the standard Aristotelian terminology, these two virtues correspond to justice and liberality, respectively,
although Aristotle also discussed other virtues, among them prudence, courage, truthfulness, and friendship.
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point, the sanctioning motive in virtue preferences is not over the moral preferences of others but
over their actions that benefit (or harm) others. For example, in a dictator game, fair dictators are
not rewarded for their intrinsic altruism per se but for generous behavior that manifests their
moral preferences. Neither intent alone nor action alone suffices: rather, virtue is intent
(understood now as moral preferences) coupled with action. Finally, a subtle but important point
is that virtue is the notional willingness to behave morally, even if the effective, or actual,
behavior differs due to obstacles that preclude more precise expression of that willingness
because choice is subject to constraints or uncertainty. For example, a dictator, who is willing to
share $12 with a recipient is more virtuous than a dictator, who is only willing to share $10, even
if both share the same $10 due to experimental rules that cap transfers at $10. Note, however,
that, to count as virtue, action must be involved, even if the effective action differs from the
notional one.
Moral character refers to an individual’s set of virtues. Of course, depending on the
context, multiple virtues might be in play. For example, in the contexts examined here,
conditional altruism predicts that moral behavior reflects equity and altruism, and later examples
add efficiency. Virtue ethicists argue that the relative importance of the different virtues in
determining right action is context-dependent. The theory presented here also involves contextdependence: the context determines which moral norms are relevant in identifying the
entitlement, and moral and non-moral context determine the relative and absolute salience of
morality as a whole. Note that virtues are valued only in so far they benefit others, so in the
context of allocative preferences, I assume moral character can be measured by intrinsically
motivated generosity, that is, the willingness to sacrifice materially, whether for the sake of
fairness, altruism or both. Denote this 𝛾𝛾, where 𝛾𝛾 ∈ ℝ, and suppose 𝛾𝛾 is distributed according to
the cumulative distribution function Γ(𝛾𝛾), where Γ(𝛾𝛾) has support [𝛾𝛾, 𝛾𝛾] with −∞ < 𝛾𝛾 ≤ 0 <
𝛾𝛾 < ∞. This is the variable that individuals are assumed to be motivated to sanction in the
contexts studied here. 4 Specifically, the morally relevant generosity is notional, so I will

conceptualize it with the following reference state. Consider an agent, who may make a

unilateral, anonymous and unlimited transfer of resources to or from a patient. There is no role
Note that the moral types formulation produces a counterintuitive implication for fairness preferences with superfair agents: as previously mentioned, in this case, a fairer agent is less generous but in the moral types approach
more deserving of reward. Formulating the variable that is sanctioned in behavioral terms, in which only
disadvantageous inequity aversion contributes to generosity, avoids this unfortunate implication.

4
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for strategic self-interest, and the agent’s only motivation for departing from narrow material
interests is moral preferences. The reference state is like a standard dictator game, except that the
dictator has unlimited access to the entire material endowments of both parties. Further assume
that, in this hypothetical dictator game, even the most generous dictator would keep some his or
her own endowment (𝛾𝛾 < 𝑋𝑋) and that even the most selfish dictator would not take all of the
recipient’s endowment (�𝛾𝛾� < 𝑌𝑌). Although not necessary, this assumption simplifies the

analysis, but it also seems plausible, at least for populations like subjects in economics

experiments, who would likely neither give away their last material possession nor take away the
last possession of another.
Virtue preferences are preferences over moral character, specifically, preferences to
reward the good, or praiseworthy, moral character of another, or to punish the bad, or
blameworthy, moral character of another. In the present case, moral character is an expression of
allocative preferences, which reduces to intrinsic generosity, so that virtue preferences are
preferences over this generosity. These sanctioning preferences consist of several parts. Let us
begin with an agent, who is capable of sanctioning others. For concreteness, think of a spectator,
who may make transfers to or from a dictator after observing that dictator’s transfer to a
recipient. That is, the agent may transfer an amount to or from another, denoted 𝑧𝑧 ∈ ℝ, whereby

the range of possibilities in studies considered here comprises 𝑧𝑧 ∈ [𝑧𝑧, 𝑍𝑍], where −∞ < 𝑧𝑧 ≤ 0,

0 ≤ 𝑍𝑍 < ∞ and 𝑧𝑧 < 𝑍𝑍. This agent may make transfers for allocative reasons but also in order to

sanction, i.e., to reward or punish another beyond what allocative preferences alone demand. The

agent’s ideal level of sanctioning is denoted 𝑧𝑧̃ , and this depends on the agent’s estimate of the

other’s moral character (in the present case, the agent’s estimate of the sanctioned person’s

notional generosity), 𝛾𝛾�. Since the decision context differs from the thought experiment described

above, the other’s actual moral character, 𝛾𝛾, is not known and must be estimated. As explained in
later sections, 𝛾𝛾� is based on the other’s choices as well as the decision context, including the

reigning moral salience and constraints on the other’s choices. In addition, for each agent and
given the level of salience in the reference state, 𝜎𝜎�, there is a threshold value of 𝛾𝛾, denoted 𝛾𝛾�,
where I assume 𝛾𝛾 < 𝛾𝛾� < 𝛾𝛾. Above this threshold, the agent judges the other’s character as

praiseworthy and deserving of reward and, below it, the other’s character is viewed as

blameworthy and deserving of punishment. This “character threshold” may differ across
10

sanctioning agents.
The ideal sanction, 𝑧𝑧̃ , is assumed to depend on 𝛾𝛾� and 𝛾𝛾� through the term 𝑟𝑟: ℝ2 → ℝ,

which is the twice continuously differentiable function
𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�)

2
where 𝑟𝑟(0) = 0, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 > 0 for 𝑘𝑘 ≡ 𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�, and 𝜕𝜕 𝑟𝑟�𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘 2 < 0.

This implies a positive ideal sanction, 𝑧𝑧̃ > 0, when estimated character exceeds the threshold,

𝛾𝛾� > 𝛾𝛾�, and a negative 𝑧𝑧̃ < 0, when the opposite is the case, 𝛾𝛾� < 𝛾𝛾�. In addition, the concavity of 𝑟𝑟
captures the idea that blameworthy character implies greater punishment than the reward for

praiseworthy character of an equal degree. I assume that agents care in differing degrees about
sanctioning, denoted 𝜃𝜃 ≥ 0, which is distributed according to the cumulative distribution

function Θ(𝜃𝜃), where Θ(𝜃𝜃) has support [𝜃𝜃, 𝜃𝜃] with 0 = 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃 < ∞, and 0 < Θ(0) < 1. That is,
there is a mass of people, who care not a whit about sanctioning. To 𝑟𝑟 and 𝜃𝜃 we add the scale of
the sanction, 𝑥𝑥′, which specifies the magnitude of reward or punishment appropriate to the

context. This provides a measure of the importance of the action. To ignore the scale of the
decision context, when choosing how to sanction character, would have implausible

implications, such as taking a bad person, who is curt with a waiter, to be equally deserving of
punishment as someone of equally bad character, who robs a bank. Since virtue is willingness
coupled with action, and people are not sanctioned merely for being, character must be matched
with a context that involves choice. In contexts with certainty about the mapping of choices to
allocations, I propose defining the scale as the transfer called for by the moral norm, viz., the
patient’s entitlement less any endowment such that 𝑥𝑥 ′ = 𝜂𝜂 − 𝑌𝑌 (I will present a more general

specification that includes uncertainty in section 4). Thus, the ideal sanction can be expressed
𝑧𝑧̃ = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′.

If a person is precluded from taking an action that reveals moral character, then I assume 𝑟𝑟 ≡ 0
and, therefore, 𝑧𝑧̃ = 0.

Finally, to sanction means to increase or decrease the patient’s payoff beyond what is

called for by distributive preferences alone (i.e., 𝜂𝜂), so 𝑧𝑧̃ is incorporated into the fairness

function. The complete specification of the utility function of an agent with moral salience,
material utility, fairness, altruism and virtue preferences is
(3)

𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 ) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂 − 𝑧𝑧̃ ) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑧𝑧, 𝛼𝛼).
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We next proceed to flesh out various specifications of this utility function to classic results on
reciprocity and then apply it to a new experiment followed by three anomalies.

3. Reciprocity
Reciprocity refers to a type of behavior, where people may deviate from fairness in order
to return kindness with kindness, called positive reciprocity, or unkindness with unkindness,
called negative reciprocity. Such behavior has been found in numerous experimental designs,
including with the seminal gift exchange game of Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), the trust
game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), the triadic design of Cox (2004), and the
moonlighting game of Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000). These results can be summarized
in the following stylized fact (abbreviated SF) from experiments on reciprocity.
SF 3.1: Stakeholders punish selfish and reward generous choices (e.g., Güth, Schmittberger and
Schwarze, 1982, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995, Cox, 2004, Abbink, Irlenbusch and
Renner, 2000). Moreover, they sanction asymmetrically, punishing selfishness more
strongly than they reward an equal degree of generosity (e.g., Croson and Konow, 2009,
Cushman, Dreber, Wang and Costa, 2009, Offerman, 2002).
Further studies show that subjects exhibit generalized reciprocity, acting not only when they are
themselves the objects of kindness or unkindness but also as third parties sanctioning kindness or
unkindness by others toward others, e.g., Almenberg, Dreber, Apicella and Rand (2011), and
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004).
In strategic designs, it is often ambiguous, whether such behavior reflects reciprocal
altruism, i.e., a preference to reward or punish, or some other motive(s) (see Sobel, 2005, for an
excellent theoretical treatment of types of reciprocity). 5 For that reason and others, I frame the
As an illustration of this point, consider the ultimatum game, in which a “proposer” proposes a division of a fixed
sum of money between him/herself and a “responder,” and the responder either accepts, and the sum is divided as
proposed, or rejects, in which case both earn nothing (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982). The subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium under the standard assumptions of rational, self-interested agents is for the responder to
accept any amount, however small, and for the proposer, therefore, to offer the minimum amount. Nevertheless, the
results of hundreds of replications show that proposers typically offer non-negligible positive amounts and
responders often reject positive offers of less than one-half (Camerer, 2003). But there are various alternative
motives at play in this game. For example, responders might reject for purely distributive reasons (i.e., fairness) and
not to punish the proposer, and their decision whether to reject might also be affected by efficiency preferences or
altruism. Even if the responder wishes to punish the proposer, though, the proposer’s intentions might be obscured
by motives other than fairness, such as a self-interested desire to avoid rejection, which is further confounded by risk
preferences. Indeed, comparison with other games imply decisions in the ultimatum game result from a confluence
of motives, e.g., Forsythe , Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994).
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discussion around a non-strategic dictator experiment on reciprocal motives. Croson and Konow
(2009) introduced a two-stage dictator game in which a dictator first chooses one of six divisions
with a recipient of a sum of money, 𝑋𝑋 = 10, viz., {(10-0), (8-2), (6-4), (4-6), (2-8), (0-10)}.

Then, there follows a previously unannounced second stage, in which a different subject chooses
a division between the same subjects of an additional sum of money, 𝑍𝑍 = 20, in any integer

amounts. In one experimental condition, the second stage dictator and recipient are the first stage
recipient and dictator, respectively. For clarity, I will refer to them consistently according to their
first stage roles as D and R, respectively. In this condition, R is in the second stage a stakeholder,
or party to the allocations. In another condition, the second stage allocator is a third party, or
spectator, who is paid a fixed sum to allocate Z between D and R. Another pair of treatments is
identical to these two with stakeholder and spectator versions, except the first stage allocation is
not chosen by anyone but rather is randomly assigned, so this is a 2 × 2 between-subjects design.

The strategy method is employed for second stage allocations: all second stage allocators choose
a division of Z for each of the six possible first stage divisions. The variable of interest is the
allocation decisions about Z by the second stage allocators based on whether they were
themselves a stakeholder or spectator and on whether the first stage division was chosen by a
dictator or randomly determined.
Take first the case of the stakeholder, R, who is endowed with the amount received from
the first stage, x, plus the second stage sum, Z, and can transfer any amount, 𝑧𝑧 ∈ [0, 𝑍𝑍], to D

(note f refers here to D as the second stage recipient). This R’s utility function can be written
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥 + 𝑍𝑍 − 𝑧𝑧) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥 ′ ) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑧𝑧, 𝛼𝛼)

where the entitlement of the current recipient is 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = 𝑍𝑍�2 − 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 . That is, D is entitled to
one-half of the current endowment, 𝑍𝑍�2, since this is a simple D game. In addition, 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 reverses
any inequity in how much D took in the first stage, 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 , where 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 = 𝑋𝑋�2 is the fair

division of the first stage stakes, again taken to be equal splits, since this is a simple D game with
fixed stakes. We can also specify virtue preferences more precisely for this experiment. As

explained in section 2, threshold generosity, 𝛾𝛾�, is the break-even level of generosity for reward or

punishment and depends on moral salience in the reference state, 𝜎𝜎�. But since the choice of
reference state is arbitrary and salience depends on many aspects of moral and non-moral

context, we can define the reference state to correspond to one in which moral salience is at the
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same level as in the first stage of the dictator game at hand. In that case, threshold generosity, 𝛾𝛾�,
equals the threshold transfer of D in the first stage, 𝑥𝑥�. Similarly, R’s estimate of D’s generosity,

𝛾𝛾�, then corresponds to D’s actual generosity in the first stage, 𝑥𝑥. 6 Finally, the scale is the fair

transfer from D to R, i.e., the fair division of the first stage sum, 𝑥𝑥 ′ = 𝑋𝑋�2, since R is unendowed
in this design. Then, R’s utility function in the second stage can be written

𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥 + 𝑍𝑍 − 𝑧𝑧) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎�𝑧𝑧 − 𝑍𝑍�2 + 𝑋𝑋�2 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�) ∙ 𝑋𝑋�2� + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑧𝑧, 𝛼𝛼).

Now we come to the following theorem about stakeholders in this experiment.

THEOREM 3.1: In the two-stage dictator game, second stage allocators, who are stakeholders,
partially adjust for first stage transfers that are random, i.e., 0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 < 1, but some
stakeholders sanction first stage dictators, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 increases, when those dictators
choose first stage allocations.
PROOF: See Appendix 1.

When first stage endowments are random, first stage dictators cannot reveal their moral
character, so 𝑟𝑟 = 0, 𝑧𝑧̃ = 0, and the partial adjustment of 𝑧𝑧 to 𝑥𝑥 follows from allocative

preferences. When first stage dictators reveal their character through their choices, however, 𝑟𝑟′ >
0, and second stage allocators sanction. These claims are all consistent with the evidence on
stakeholder decisions from this experiment.

Note that one part of SF 3.1 that is not claimed in Theorem 3.1 is asymmetric

sanctioning. Stakeholder allocations do not produce a clear measure of this asymmetry, given the
confluence of additional motives, including material self-interest, inequity aversion and altruism,
so we turn now to spectators, whose decisions are predicted to generate a measure that is not
distorted by these factors. The utility function of a spectator in this experiment can be written
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎�𝑧𝑧 − 𝑍𝑍�2 + 𝑋𝑋�2 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�) ∙ 𝑋𝑋�2�.

where 𝑧𝑧̅ represents the fixed payment the spectator receives for making this decision. Remember

that no altruism term is included in a spectator’s utility function, since the relationship is
impartial rather than personal. 7 Theorem 3.2 follows.

To be exact, 𝛾𝛾� = 𝑥𝑥 for interior solutions, but further specification of 𝛾𝛾� is needed in the case of corner solutions.
This refinement is unnecessary for the current focus on mean behavior, but it will be addressed in section 4, where it
provides insight into an additional finding that becomes apparent in the design discussed there.
7
Note also that the fairness preference is formulated with respect to the first stage dictator, because that is the
6
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THEOREM 3.2: In the two-stage dictator game with randomly assigned first stage allocations,
second stage allocators, who are spectators, equalize, adjusting completely for first stage
transfers that are random, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 1. When dictators choose first stage allocations,

some spectators sanction them, i.e., 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 > 1, and some equalize. Those who sanction
have different thresholds, 𝑥𝑥�, and sanction, on average, asymmetrically, punishing more
strongly than they reward.

PROOF: See Appendix 1.
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FIGURE 1. – Sanctioning in Croson and Konow (2009).

Spectator transfers are assumed to be motivated solely by fairness and virtue preferences.
When first stage allocations are random, spectators adjust z to x one-for-one, but, when they are
chosen by first stage dictators, virtue preferences kick in, and spectators sanction. The
2
asymmetry follows from the fact that 𝑑𝑑 𝑧𝑧�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 2 < 0 due to the concavity of r. All of these claims

are consistent with the spectator decisions in this experiment. For each level of transfers chosen

by first stage dictators, Figure 1 illustrates spectator reward or punishment as the mean amounts
by which their transfers to the first stage dictator, z, fall short of or exceed equalizing transfers.
The mean sanctions of all spectators are illustrated in the light bars, but only 50% of spectators
sanction, consistent with the assumption that some agents place zero weight on sanctioning

subject, who has revealed something about his character. A term could be added for fairness toward the first stage
recipient, but unfairness toward one first stage subject is simply mirrored by unfairness in the opposite direction
toward another, and the conclusions are qualitatively unaffected, so I avoid this clutter as in previous analysis of
spectator allocations in dictator games, e.g., Konow (2000).
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(Θ(0) > 0). Another 37% equalize, and the other 13% cannot be put into either category. 8 The

mean reward and punishment of only those who sanction are illustrated in the darker bars. Figure
1 suggests an asymmetry, which is corroborated in more formal analysis in Croson and Konow
and is generally consistent with third party sanctioning in other studies, such as Almenberg et al.
(2011) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). Moreover, the results reveal the assumed heterogeneity
in thresholds: of spectators who sanction, 27% stop punishing (and thereafter either equalize or
begin rewarding) at a first stage transfer of 0, 40% at 2, 20% at 4, and 13% at 6.

4. Sinners and Saints
This section introduces an experiment that provides an out-of-sample test of the theory
presented in this paper while shedding light on other findings, including the taking effect. In
what I will call the “sinners and saints” game, there is a first stage in which dictators may give to
or take an amount 𝑥𝑥 from the endowments of the dictators and recipients, where 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌 > 0. The
endowments are always fixed at the same level, but the range of permissible transfers varies
across “cases.” Cases are varied between subjects, whereby, for a given case, the minimum

possible transfer, i.e., the most the D can take, is denoted 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 ≤ 0, and the maximum possible

transfer is denoted 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 > 0. Then, there is an unannounced second stage in which a spectator is

paid a fixed amount, 𝑧𝑧̅, to allocate an additional larger sum, 𝑍𝑍 > 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑌𝑌, between the D and the R
in the first stage, which is contingent on each possible D choice for 𝑥𝑥, i.e., the strategy method is

used. To employ a metaphysical conceit, an agent decides how to treat a patient during his mortal

life, ignorant of the afterlife in which an impartial judge metes out sanctions on sinners and

saints that involve even higher stakes. This experiment, while novel, merges design features that
have been well validated elsewhere and that, therefore, relate to a broader set of results. 9
The first stage of the sinners and saints game is a variation on a dictator game with
taking, so I begin with a brief review of the stakeholder analysis, including assumptions, stylized

The comments of the 13% in the post-experimental questionnaire indicate that half misunderstood their task and
that the other half believed (mistakenly) that there was some strategic dimension of the decisions.
9
Spectators in a two-stage dictator experiment were introduced in Croson and Konow (2009) and discussed in the
prior section, but the design of that study differed in other ways from the present one: there are never any taking
options, in treatments where Ds can choose, only Ds are endowed but not Rs, in other treatments, endowments are
random and Ds cannot transfer, and the range of permissible transfers is not varied. As with the current design,
Krupka and Weber (2013) used spectators and stakeholders to analyze taking, but their design differs in that third
parties are not used to sanction but rather to provide self-reported appropriateness ratings of stakeholder transfers on
a point scale, stakeholder endowments are varied, and taking options are not varied.
8
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facts, and theoretical conclusions, which are numbered here as in Konow (2022), where they are
presented in greater detail. A motivation for the taking effect can be seen in otherwise lawabiding citizens, who sometimes join in looting during civil disturbances and natural disasters.
Dictator experiments with take options demonstrate that such taking behavior persists, even after
controlling for possible extrinsic incentives, such as the fear of punishment. The taking effect is
an example of a class of anomalies involving variation in helping and harming opportunities. 10 In
a dictator game where Ds and Rs are endowed 𝑋𝑋 > 𝑌𝑌 > 0, assume giving opportunities
constitute moral context and taking opportunities non-moral context. Specifically, for

concreteness, let the moral measure be 𝑚𝑚(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) = max{𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 } − min{𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 }, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = {𝐶𝐶+ , 𝐶𝐶− },

where 𝐶𝐶+ is the set of non-negative transfers from D to R and 𝐶𝐶− the set of negative transfers,

i.e., transfers from R to D (Assumption 7). Then, adding take options reduces giving on both the
intensive and extensive margins, i.e., the mean transfer and frequency of positive transfers
decrease, and mean transfers fall at a decreasing rate (SF 6.1 and Theorem 6.1).
The focus of most of the theoretical and empirical analysis here is on second stage
spectators, who allocate an additional larger sum, 𝑍𝑍, between the first stage D and R as with the
two-stage dictator game of the prior section. Specifically, the utility function of the spectator in
the sinners and saints game is

𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎�𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑋𝑋�2�,

where moral preferences are formulated with respect to the D from the first stage, whose choice
provides a signal of the D’s character. Thus, 𝑧𝑧 denotes the amount of 𝑍𝑍 that the spectator

allocates to D with the remainder of 𝑍𝑍 − 𝑧𝑧 going to R, 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 is the D’s entitlement in the second
stage, 𝛾𝛾� is D’s estimated notional generosity to R, and 𝛾𝛾� is the spectator’s threshold for

rewarding or punishing D. The usual assumption that fairness reduces to equal splits in a simple
D game like this implies that 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = 𝑍𝑍�2 − 𝑋𝑋�2 − 𝑌𝑌�2 + 𝑥𝑥, i.e., 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 calls for equal splits of the total

endowments and corrects for any shortfall or excess vis-à-vis equality in D’s first stage transfer.
The following theorem states several predictions for this experiment.

Theorem 4.1: In the sinners and saints game, second stage spectators sanction, and sanctions are
concave in dictator first stage transfers. There is a discontinuous increase in reward (or

Another example of this class of anomalies, which is discussed in Konow (2022), is joy-of-destruction, where
agents may, with no personal gain, destroy others’ earnings.
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decrease in punishment) at 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 , and a converse discontinuity at 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 , i.e., a decrease in
reward (or increase in punishment). Holding 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 constant, increasing dictator taking

options, i.e., lowering 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 , implies a lower threshold for spectator sanctioning, 𝑥𝑥�, and also
increases reward, or decreases punishment, of dictators by spectators at every level of
dictator transfers.

FIGURE 2. – Notional and effective generosity.
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix 1, but the reasoning is illustrated in
Figures 2 and 3. First, the context of the reference state may be defined to match the salience in
the first stage of this dictator game, 𝜎𝜎�. In a game with the same set of permissible transfers as in

the reference state, expected generosity, 𝛾𝛾�, equals notional generosity, 𝛾𝛾, both of which equal the

dictator’s transfer, 𝑥𝑥, for the full range of dictator types from the least generous, 𝛾𝛾, which is the

greatest lower bound of notional generosity, to the most generous, 𝛾𝛾̅ , which is the lowest upper

bound of notional generosity. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the 45-degree line. Thus, we can
write notional generosity, 𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥, 𝜎𝜎�), as a function of 𝑥𝑥 and 𝜎𝜎�. As noted in section 2, however,

notional generosity may differ from effective generosity, 𝑥𝑥, because of constraints on choices.
Suppose at least some dictators are constrained to giving less than their preferred amount, i.e.,

𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 < 𝛾𝛾̅ , and/or from taking less than their preferred amount, i.e., 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 > 𝛾𝛾. Due to this censoring,
18

a spectator’s estimate of the notional generosity of a dictator who chooses 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 , 𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 , 𝜎𝜎�), is
greater than that of the dictator type, who would choose 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 in the reference state, 𝛾𝛾 𝐻𝐻 =

𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 , 𝜎𝜎�), since it includes not only those who notionally prefer 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 but also others who prefer a
larger transfer but are prevented from transferring it. Similarly, the spectator’s estimate of the
generosity of a dictator who chooses 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 , 𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎�), is less than that of the dictator type, who

notionally prefers 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 , 𝛾𝛾 𝐿𝐿 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎�). Suppose that the spectator’s character threshold for dictator

generosity is 𝛾𝛾� and that 𝛾𝛾 𝐿𝐿 < 𝛾𝛾� < 𝛾𝛾 𝐻𝐻 . Then, in the interior, 𝛾𝛾� = 𝑥𝑥�, and the spectator rewards all
𝑥𝑥 > 𝑥𝑥� and punishes all 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑥𝑥�, and, generalizing Theorem 3.2, sanctions are asymmetric due to
the concavity of 𝑟𝑟 in 𝑥𝑥. One exception to concavity is occasioned by the censoring of 𝛾𝛾 at 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 :

the optimal sanction, 𝑧𝑧̃ , is increasing in 𝛾𝛾, so the discontinuity here implies a discontinuous

increase in reward (or reduction in punishment). Because of the predicted discontinuities at 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿
and 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 , these will be treated separately in the regression analysis later.

𝛾𝛾, 𝛾𝛾�

𝛾𝛾� ℎ

𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥, 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 )

𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 < 𝜎𝜎� < 𝜎𝜎 ℎ

𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥, 𝜎𝜎 ℎ )

𝛾𝛾�

𝛾𝛾� 𝑙𝑙

𝑥𝑥� 𝑙𝑙

𝑥𝑥

𝑥𝑥� ℎ

𝑥𝑥

FIGURE 3. – Generosity and moral salience.
Other claims of Theorem 4.1 are illustrated in Figure 3, which focuses on interior
solutions. Estimated (and notional) generosity can be written as a function of 𝑥𝑥 and 𝜎𝜎, i.e.,
𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥, 𝜎𝜎). The main analysis involves variation in the amounts that may be taken, which, as

already discussed, affects moral salience. Starting from the reference level of salience, 𝜎𝜎�,

consider an increase in taking options (the line going through the origin that corresponds to the
reference state is omitted here to avoid clutter). Ceteris paribus, salience falls to 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 , 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 < 𝜎𝜎�, and
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a dictator, who would make a transfer, say, equal to the spectator’s threshold of 𝛾𝛾� under 𝜎𝜎�, will
now give less, 𝑥𝑥� 𝑙𝑙 . That is, the schedule representing the dictator’s notional generosity shifts to
the left, 𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥, 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 ), and the spectator’s threshold for sanctioning falls. Similarly, a reduction in

taking options increases salience to 𝜎𝜎 ℎ , 𝜎𝜎 ℎ > 𝜎𝜎�, and the same dictator will now give more, 𝑥𝑥� ℎ ,

shifting the schedule to the right, 𝛾𝛾(𝑥𝑥, 𝜎𝜎 ℎ ), and increasing the spectator’s threshold for

sanctioning. Finally, changes in taking options also affect the spectator’s estimate of a dictator’s
type and, therefore, the spectator’s sanctioning of the dictator (which is the same as the dictator’s
notional type for interior solutions). A dictator, who gives 𝑥𝑥 under low salience, 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 , reveals

higher intrinsic generosity, 𝛾𝛾� ℎ , than one, who gives the same amount under high salience, 𝜎𝜎 ℎ ,

and reveals lower generosity, 𝛾𝛾� 𝑙𝑙 . Thus, the same transfer may be praiseworthy in the former case
but blameworthy in the latter, according to spectators. The final claim of Theorem 4.1 concerns
the size of the discontinuous increase in 𝑧𝑧 at 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 and the relationship to 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 . An expansion of 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿

reduces 𝜎𝜎, censors fewer dictator types, and increases 𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 , 𝜎𝜎). This reduces the discontinuity, if
the increase in 𝛾𝛾� is smaller than the change in censored types.

The parameters of this experiment are as follows: 𝑋𝑋 = 15, 𝑌𝑌 = 5, 𝑍𝑍 = 40, and 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 = 5

for all of the three main cases, which differ according to the values of 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 , viz., the Give 5 case
with 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 =0, Take 1 case where 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 = −1, and Take 5 case where 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 = −5. Note that 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 = 5

allows X to equalize payments between the X and Y. The values for 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 were chosen to permit

testing of the theoretical predictions and to allow comparisons with prior taking games. The main
treatment of the sinners and saints game that has been described thus far is called the Double
dictator treatment: subject X chooses how much to transfer to or from subject Y out of their
aggregate 20 points, and subject Z is paid a fixed $5 to allocate 40 points between subjects X and
Y for each possible transfer by X to Y, where one point always equals $0.20. In order to examine
whether the entitlement changes with cases, there is also a so-called Benevolent dictator
treatment in which X and Y are endowed as in the other treatment, i.e., 𝑋𝑋 = 15 and 𝑌𝑌 = 5, and

each Z subject is paid a fixed $2 to choose a transfer of these first stage points between X and Y
subjects. Thus, the design is the same as the first stage of the Double dictator treatment with the
same cases, except Z instead of X chooses transfers between X and Y, and there is no second
stage decision. To avoid any spillover effects of roles and decision contexts on allocations, all
decisions were collected between subjects, i.e., different subjects were used in the roles of X, Y
and Z, in the two treatments, and in the different cases. The complete protocol can be found in
20

Appendix 2 (not for publication).
Treatment
Case

Double dictator

Benevolent dictator

Give 5

66 X, 66 Y, 66 Z

30 X, 30 Y, 30 Z

Take 1

62 X, 62 Y, 62 Z

45 X, 45 Y, 45 Z

Take 5

63 X, 63 Y, 63 Z

37 X, 37 Y, 37 Z

TABLE 1
SINNERS AND SAINTS DESIGN
The experiment was programmed in oTree (Chen, Schonger and Wickens, 2016) and
conducted on Amazon MTurk. Table 1 illustrates the experimental design, showing for each case
and treatment the number of participants in each role, whereby those in decision-making roles
are denoted in bold font. Similar to many related studies (e.g., Bardsley, 2008, Chowdury, Jeon,
and Saha, 2017, Grossman and Eckel, 2015, Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2012), a minimum
of roughly 30 observations (i.e., 30 triples) per case were targeted for the Benevolent dictator
treatment, and a minimum of twice that number, viz., 60 triples per case, were targeted for the
Double dictator treatment, since it is the main treatment of interest. The actual numbers usually
exceed these minimums due to differences in the timing of when subjects were cut off from
entering. For this study, an MTurk subject pool was preferred for a number of reasons. A
substantial literature now exists that MTurk participants behave similarly to university student
subjects in qualitative terms. Moreover, MTurkers are typically closer to the general population
in terms of demographic characteristics and average experimental behavior, e.g., Snowberg and
Yariv (2021) find the average generosity of MTurk dictators intermediate to that of the more
selfish students and that of a more generous representative sample. 11 In addition, the total sample
size desired for this study was larger than that accessible at any given time from most student
subject pools (the results are based on a total of 1029 participants). Moreover, this study lends
itself to the adoption of measures to address typical concerns about an online subject pool (e.g.,

Johnson and Ryan (2019) conclude that quality is not harmed by the lack of control and lower stakes on MTurk.
Moreover, the equivalency of results from student and MTurk subjects extends to designs involving moral
preferences, such as prisoner’s dilemmas (e.g., Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser, 2011), public goods games (e.g.,
Arechar, Gächter, and Molleman, 2018), and dictator games (e.g., Snowberg and Yariv, 2021).
11
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see Hauser, Paolacci, and Chandler, 2019). 12 Including the $2 show-up fee (called a reward in
MTurk), the average earnings were $6.25 for an average of 20-25 minutes of most subjects’ time.
This is several times the usual MTurk pay of $1-$5 per hour and similar to the hourly wages used
by Snowberg and Yariv, moreover, they report their results are robust halving the incentives.
Mean transfer (SD)

Positive transfers (%)

Give 5

3.45 (2.105)

78.8

Take 1

2.16 (2.343)

64.5

Take 5

1.78 (3.777)

61.9

TABLE 2
TRANSFERS BY X TO Y IN DOUBLE DICTATOR TREATMENT
Turning now to the results, Table 2 summarizes the transfers of X subjects in the Double
dictator treatment. As predicted, the mean transfers and percentage of positive transfers decrease,
as 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 falls. According to two-sided t-tests tests of differences in means, the mean transfer is

lower in the Take 1 (p=0.001) and in the Take 5 (p=0.002) cases than in the Give 5 case, but
Take 1 does not differ significantly from Take 5 (p=0.497). Compared to the Give 5 case, twosided z-tests tests of proportions show a decrease in positive transfers that is marginally
significant in the Take 1 case (p=0.073) and significant at conventional levels in the Take 5 case
(p=0.036), but Take 1 and Take 5 do not differ significantly (p=0.762). These findings are
similar in direction and significance to prior related taking games except that these X subjects
are, on average, more generous and less likely to take, when given the opportunity. This is
consistent with the expectation that the more representative sample here is more generous than
student subjects, who were used in prior studies. A second contributing factor is surely the
relatively high ratio of X to Y endowments of 3:1 here versus the lower ones (usually 2:1) used
To address concerns about English language fluency, participation was restricted to US residents. Numeracy was
established with a test consisting of three fill-in-the-blank questions on addition and subtraction that permitted at
most two attempts each before disqualification. To address concerns about attention and comprehension, subjects
had to complete correctly within two attempts each of three questions in a quiz about the instructions (two quizzes of
three questions each in the case of Z subjects in the more complicated Double dictator treatment). To minimize
attrition, each subject faced only one type of decision and the non-strategic design permitted non-simultaneous
collection so that subjects did not have to wait for other subjects. The simple design helped keep the study short and
address both subject attention and attrition: subjects were permitted up to one hour, but most completed it in less
than thirty minutes. Self-selection biases are presumably less problematic with MTurk than with a university subject
pool, but that concern was further addressed by describing the study in general terms as an “Academic experiment
involving decisions about the distribution of money.” As an aside, the data collection took place during the 2020-21
COVID pandemic at a time when laboratory experiments were not feasible, but that fact had no bearing on the
choice of an online format, which had been previously planned based on its advantages for this experiment.
12
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in prior studies, including Bardsley (2008), List (2007), and Zhang and Ortmann (2013).
Having established that X decisions are consistent with theoretical predictions for
stakeholders and qualitatively replicate prior findings, we turn now to the spectator Z allocations
in the Double dictator treatment. Table 3 provides a summary of Z transfers to X subjects. The
first row presents the full range of X transfers considered and the second row the corresponding
Z transfers to X that equalize total earnings between X and Y. The remaining rows report the
mean allocation by Z to X, 𝑧𝑧, for each level of X transfer, 𝑥𝑥, for each case, which permits a

preliminary impression of the results. As predicted, 𝑧𝑧 is monotonically increasing in 𝑥𝑥 within

each case in every instance and monotonically decreasing in 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 for each given value of 𝑥𝑥 save in

one instance (Take 1, 𝑥𝑥 = 5). Comparison of these means with the equalizing Z allocations

suggest that Zs usually punish Xs, on average (shaded in red), for transferring less than the 5

points that equalize first stage payoffs: 𝑧𝑧 exceeds the value that equalizes total earnings (shaded
in blue), only for an 𝑥𝑥 of 4 or 5 in the Take 5 case and for an 𝑥𝑥 of 5 in the Take 1 case. This is
consistent with the predicted shift in 𝑥𝑥� with 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 : the change from Take 5 to Take 1 to Give 5

represents a progressive increase in 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 and in salience and, therefore, an increase in the threshold

for rewarding X transfers.
X transfer
Equalizing Z allocation
Take 5
Take 1
Give 5

-5
10
5.17

-4
11
5.89

-3
12
6.03

-2
13
7.13

-1
14
8.02
6.10

0
1
2
3
4
5
15
16
17
18
19
20
13.08 15.27 16.19 17.92 19.40 20.70
9.53 12.87 15.85 17.73 18.65 21.71
7.82 11.44 12.82 13.68 16.03 19.08

TABLE 3
MEAN ALLOCATIONS BY Z SUBJECTS TO X SUBJECTS IN DOUBLE DICTATOR TREATMENT
Key: Red (blue) allocations are below (above) equalizing ones. Means differ from equalizing transfers according to
t-tests at the 5%/10% level of significance; lightly shaded results are not significant at conventional levels.

Figure 4 presents a scatterplot of Z decisions, where circle sizes are proportionate to the
frequency of each choice and colors correspond to cases: yellow for Give 5, green for Take 1 and
blue for Take 5. The main patterns are consistent with theory: 𝑧𝑧 is increasing in 𝑥𝑥, on average,

and some Z subjects equalize, indicated by larger circles along a diagonal, whereas others

sanction, reflected mostly by punishment below the diagonal. Turning to multivariate analysis of
Z decisions, consider the following regression equation:
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 ln(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 2) + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇5 + 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

where 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the allocation of Z subject i to subject X based an X transfer of 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 , 𝛼𝛼 is the constant,
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the 𝛽𝛽s are the coefficients on the independent variables, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is the error term. The omitted
case is Give 5, so Take1 and Take5 are dummy variables for those cases, respectively.

Discontinuities are predicted at 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 and 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 , so dummy variables are included at the lowest

possible transfer in each respective case for 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 and at 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 = 5, where 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 is common to all cases.

The analysis focuses on Tobit regressions with left-censoring using a logarithmic specification of
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 for values between −1 and 5, which is why 2 is added to 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 , making the minimum value of

this independent variable 1. There are several reasons for these choices. First, the non-linear

specification is consistent both with theoretical expectations and with the results of regression
estimations illustrated by the logarithmic trendlines in Figure 4. Second, the fact that second
stage allocations are twice as large as the stakes in the first stage (viz., 40 vs. 20 points) is a

feature designed to give wide berth to second stage allocators, and inspection of the scatterplot
suggests this was largely successful. Nevertheless, scatterplots also reveal considerable censoring
of 𝑧𝑧 at values of 𝑥𝑥, especially below −1, and recommend the use of Tobit. Third, the chief

interest is in comparison of differences across cases where there are common values of 𝑥𝑥 for at

least some cases. Moreover, including additional negative 𝑥𝑥 values for the Take 5 case produces
results that are qualitatively similar but risks producing estimates that give disproportionate

weight to the Take 5 case and its increasingly censored values (reaching 46% of allocations
when 𝑥𝑥 equals −5).

FIGURE 4. – Scatterplot and logarithmic regression trendlines of Z allocations to X (z).
Key: Yellow: Give 5, Green: Take 1, Blue: Take 5
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Table 4 presents the results of regression analysis, whereby standard errors are clustered
at the level of the 191 individual Z subjects. Column 1 shows the results of an OLS regression
and column 2 the results of a Tobit regression with left-censoring. The results are qualitatively
the same except for the 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 dummy variable, which is negative in both estimations but turns

significant when account is taken of the left-censoring that is compromising the OLS estimation.

We focus, therefore, on regression (2), the results of which are all consistent with Theorem 4.1,
some at high levels of significance. Spectator sanctions are increasing and concave in X transfers
to Y. As taking options expand, spectators progressively increase reward, or decrease
punishment, significantly in the Take 1 and Take 5 treatments. The coefficient for the 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 dummy
confirms the predicted discontinuous decrease in 𝑧𝑧 and the coefficient for the 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 dummy the

predicted discontinuous increase in 𝑧𝑧.
ln(𝑥𝑥 + 2)
Take 1
Take 5
𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿

𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻

Constant
𝑅𝑅 2

(1)
OLS
6.516***
(0.509)
2.507*
(1.105)
3.587**
(1.169)
−0.580
(0.749)
1.769***
(0.417)
4.021***
(1.188)
0.255

(2)
Tobit
6.822***
(0.352)
2.662*
(1.112)
3.680***
(1.114)
−1.533*
(0.636)
1.673***
(0.464)
3.398***
(0.941)

TABLE 4
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF Z ALLOCATIONS TO X

N=191. Tobit regressions are left-censored. Standards errors are clustered at the individual subject level and
are reported in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at the 5/1/0.1-percent level.

The theory advanced here has been shown to be highly consistent with the results on
stakeholder and spectator decisions in the sinners and saints game. As always in such instances,
that fact does not rule out the possibility of alternative explanations, such as those offered by the
reciprocity theories mentioned in section 3. For example, Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) define fairness as the average of the highest and lowest efficient payoffs,
which implies fair allocations (𝜂𝜂) vary directly with 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 . Falk and Fischbacher (2006) define
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fairness as equal payoffs, but their theory generates equivalent predictions about the effect of
variation in 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 by building the effect of the choice set into their “intention factor.” Reciprocity
theories are typically formulated for stakeholders, but, for simplicity, I will cast them in the
current spectator framework and analyze the effect they predict of 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 through 𝜂𝜂.

Theorem 4.2: In the sinners and saints game, let the fair allocation in the first stage and the
threshold for sanctioning be functions of the minimum permissible transfer, i.e., 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 (𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 )
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥�

𝜕𝜕𝜂𝜂

and 𝑥𝑥�(𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 ), respectively, where 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 > 0. Then lowering 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 increases reward,
or decreases punishment, at every level of dictator transfers.

Proof: See Appendix 1.
Reciprocity theories provide a partial account for observed spectator sanctioning: they are
consistent with the observed shift in the threshold and the level of sanctioning. They do not,
however, predict the discontinuities we observe at 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 and 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 . Moreover, reciprocity theories and
the theory proposed here diverge in their predictions for behavior in the aforementioned

Benevolent dictator treatment, in which a spectator chooses transfers between X and Y. In this
treatment, the spectator’s utility function is simply
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 ),

which yields the following predictions.
Theorem 4.3: In the Benevolent dictator treatment, the spectator allocates to subjects their
entitlements. That means the spectator’s allocation does not vary with 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 according to the
theory of moral salience, conditional altruism and virtue preferences, but it does vary
directly with 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 , according to reciprocity theories.

Proof: By the first order condition, 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 ∙

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 = 0, 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 , which implies 𝑥𝑥 = 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 . In this
𝜕𝜕𝜂𝜂

game, 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 is fixed in the theory advanced here, whereas 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 > 0 in reciprocity theories.
Table 5 presents the results of this treatment for the three main cases as well as for an

additional case, Give 10, which I will discuss momentarily. For the three main cases, the mean
transfers range from $4.04 to $4.47. The three pairwise tests reported in the table reveal that
none of these differences is significant even at the 20% level, whereby all p-values in this table
are two-sided. This is consistent with the theory proposed here but not with reciprocity theories.
A different question concerns spectator estimates of the fair transfer. Recall, as stated in section
2, that the entitlement is assumed to reduce to equal splits in simple games with fixed stakes but
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that theoretical claims do not generally depend on this specific value. Equality implies an X
transfer of 5, in this case, but the tests reported in Table 5 show that the means in the three main
cases all differ significantly from 5. Nevertheless, while comparisons of mean spectator transfers
provide valid conclusions about whether the entitlement varies with 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 , they might not provide

good estimates of the entitlement itself. As with all experiments, subject decisions here are noisy,
but variance is censored on the right at the value of 5 in the three main cases, which creates a

downward bias in the estimate of 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 . For that reason, the benevolent dictator treatment includes
an additional case, Give 10, in which spectators may allocate any amount from 0 to 10 to

subjects X. For this case, the mean transfer is $4.68, which does not differ significantly from 5.

Give 5
Take 1
Take 5
Give 10

Mean transfer (SD)
4.47
(1.335)
4.04
(1.673)
4.41
(1.077)
4.68
(1.738)

N
30
45
37
40

0.034
(2.175)
0.000
(3.849)
0.001
(-3.332)
0.245
(1.165)

Difference in Means
p-values (t-statistics)
Give 5
Take 1
0.242
(-1.179)
0.839
(-0.204)
0.584
(0.551)

0.249
(1.161)
0.088
(1.729)

Take 5

0.420
(0.812)

TABLE 5
TRANSFERS BY Z TO Y IN BENEVOLENT DICTATOR TREATMENT
This section introduced an experiment designed as an out-of-sample test of the theory
proposed here. The results of the experiment are uniformly consistent with the predictions of the
theory and, in several respects, inconsistent with reciprocity theories. In the next three sections,
the theory is applied to additional decision contexts.

5. Outcome Bias
Numerous studies across multiple disciplines have established a preference for rewarding
or punishing individuals based on uncontrollable (or brute) luck, including in politics (e.g.,
Healy, Malhotra, and Mo, 2010), sports (e.g., Kausel, Ventura and Rodriguez, 2019), and CEO
compensation (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). In the law, someone, who kills another
accidentally, can be sentenced more harshly than someone, who meant to kill another but failed
(Cushman et al., 2009). In economics, this so-called outcome bias has also been extensively
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studied experimentally, especially, in the context of the principal-agent problem (e.g., Charness
and Levine, 2007, Rubin and Sheremeta, 2016). Although the optimal contract rewards effort
and disregards luck, people sanction luck, even when decision makers are clearly not responsible
(Gurdal, Miller and Rustichini, 2013) and even when those who are sanctioning are third parties
(Brownback and Kuhn, 2019). Moreover, outcome bias is enigmatic from the perspectives of
philosophy (e.g., Williams, 1981) and of reciprocity theories in behavioral economics, which
conceptualize reward and punishment in terms of intended consequences (e.g., Rabin, 1993, Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006).
Although outcome bias is inconsistent with optimal contracts and reciprocity theories, I
argue that it is consistent with moral intuition and virtue preferences. Indeed, in a more general
specification of virtue preferences, outcome bias is not a bias, at all. Consider the intuition: two
individuals, who are operating a motor vehicle, run a stop sign, the one without consequence and
the other causing the death of a family. Do we legally, and should we morally, really hold the
two equally accountable? In the one case, the driver might pay a fine of a few hundred dollars,
whereas, in the other case, the driver can be found guilty of manslaughter and serve jail time. I
claim that “outcome bias” is a feature, not a bug, of moral preferences: in virtue preferences, the
relevant sanctioning motive is with respect to intent coupled with consequential action.
Specifically, the difference in sanctions reflects the intuition exemplified above, which can be
incorporated by scaling virtue preferences according to whether or not the intended outcome
obtained. Consider the following stylized facts from economics experiments on this topic.
SF 5.1: When an agent can choose actions with uncertain outcomes, others sanction the agent,
meaning these rewards and punishments are not explained by distributive preferences
alone. Sanctions are asymmetric: low generosity is punished more strongly than high
generosity of equal magnitude (e.g., Cushman et al., 2009, de Oliveira, Smith and
Spraggon, 2017).
SF 5.2: Under uncertainty, sanctions are based not only on the chosen action (and its expected
outcome) but also the realized outcome, for which the agent is not responsible. The
sanctions for actions leading to outcomes that are both expected and realized are greater
than those for outcomes that are expected but not realized (Charness and Levine, 2007,
Gurdal, Miller and Rustichini, 2013, Rubin and Sheremeta, 2016), and both stakeholders
as well as third parties exhibit this behavior (Brownback and Kuhn, 2019, Gino, Shu and
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Bazerman, 2010, Sezer, Zhang, Gino and Bazerman, 2016). The sanctions for realized
outcomes that agree with expected outcomes are roughly the same as those for the same
outcomes chosen with certainty (Cushman et al., 2009).
Despite considerable variation in features of these experiments, including in the role of
uncertainty, effort, information and payoff functions, the findings are quite consistent. Given
these design differences and the focus of the current analysis, therefore, I will analyze a hybrid
design that captures elements of different studies and fits the focus here on non-strategic
decisions. In what I will call the “fair luck game,” there are two stages, whereby first stage Ds
select an option from a discrete set of risky choices that differ in their expected fairness, and
then, in an unannounced second stage, the Rs may sanction the Ds based on the latter’s choices
and the realized payoffs. Specifically, suppose the first stage payoffs to D,R can be either “fair”
(F,F) or “unfair” (H,L), where 0 ≤ 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐻𝐻 = 2𝐹𝐹 = 𝑋𝑋. The first stage D makes a

risky choice, 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑓𝑓, 𝑢𝑢}, involving probability 𝑞𝑞 > 0.5, which results in expected payoffs to R,
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑢𝑢 , respectively, of
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑢𝑢 = (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐹𝐹 + 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞

where, obviously, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓 > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑢𝑢 . 13

The subject matter of outcome bias is sanctioning, so we focus on the second stage in

which the first stage R may sanction the first stage D by adding money to, or deducting money
from, D’s payoff (I will refer to them consistently as R and D according to their roles in the first
stage). This game requires specification of moral character, or generosity in this context, 𝛾𝛾, to
accommodate decisions under uncertainty. Analogous to deterministic decisions, consider a

reference state in which the first stage D may choose a benefit to the R but now let 𝛾𝛾 denote the
expected payoff to R, which is distributed on the interval [𝛾𝛾, 𝛾𝛾]. In addition, suppose R expects

This game is similar to Cushman et al. (2009) except for two design features. First, the risky options in the hybrid
number two, as in Sezer et al. (2016), rather than three, both in order to simplify the analysis and because there is
empirically little difference between the second and third choices in Cushman et al. Second, in Cushman et al. the
possibility of sanctions is common knowledge, but if first stage dictators anticipate sanctions in the second stage,
their choices might be distorted by strategic self-interest. Cushman et al. address this concern by making the
probability that sanctions are implemented negligible (viz., 0.1). In fact, the differences in punishment are
sufficiently small that expected payoffs are not appreciably affected such that the ranking of more or less generous
choices should be preserved. Alternately, the potential problem could be obviated by employing a previously
unannounced second stage (see Croson and Konow, 2009), which is assumed in the hybrid, since the results are
qualitatively the same, but this approach simplifies the formal analysis.
13
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there is a D type, 𝛾𝛾 𝑖𝑖 , who is indifferent between 𝑓𝑓 and 𝑢𝑢, where 𝛾𝛾 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑢𝑢 < 𝛾𝛾 𝑖𝑖 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓 < 𝛾𝛾 .

Whereas 𝛾𝛾 represents notional generosity, effective generosity is constrained in this game to a

binary choice between 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑢𝑢 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓 . Thus, R’s estimate of D’s notional generosity, 𝛾𝛾�, is either
𝛾𝛾� 𝑓𝑓 or 𝛾𝛾� 𝑢𝑢 , depending on D’s choice of either 𝑓𝑓 or 𝑢𝑢, which, respectively, equal

and

𝛾𝛾

𝛾𝛾

𝛾𝛾� 𝑓𝑓 = ∫𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝛾 𝜌𝜌(𝛾𝛾)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�∫𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌(𝛾𝛾)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖

𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖

𝛾𝛾� 𝑢𝑢 = ∫𝛾𝛾 𝛾𝛾 𝜌𝜌(𝛾𝛾)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�∫𝛾𝛾 𝜌𝜌(𝛾𝛾)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.

Note that 𝛾𝛾� 𝑢𝑢 < 𝛾𝛾� 𝑓𝑓 , and it is further assumed that 𝛾𝛾� 𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝛾𝛾� ≤ 𝛾𝛾� 𝑓𝑓 , i.e., R’s threshold for sanctioning
D lies within the interval of D’s estimated generosity.

Now consider R’s payoff in the second stage. In the fair luck game, R receives a fixed

amount from the first stage, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 , i.e., the realization of D’s choice in the first stage. Next is the
question of the price R pays to sanction D. In the two-stage D game discussed in section 3, R

allocates a fixed sum between D and R. That is, letting 𝑧𝑧 be the amount added to or subtracted
from D’s payoff in the second stage and 𝑌𝑌 the amount, as a result of 𝑧𝑧, that is added to or

subtracted from R’s payoff, then in the two-stage D game, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = −1. The fair luck game is

different in that sanctioning is free and produces neither gains nor losses for R, that is, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =
0. Unlike the prior case, then, there are efficiency implications of R’s decision. As previously

noted, a large volume of research finds evidence that social preferences include, and sometimes
are even dominated by, efficiency concerns (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002, Engelmann and

Strobel, 2004). The results of experiments on sanctioning discussed here are also consistent with
the idea that, when agents can sanction and 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 0, efficiency preferences crowd out other
allocative preferences (e.g., Bartling et al., 2014, Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012, Cushman et
al., 2009). 14 I model this effect with the parameter 𝛽𝛽 = − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑, whereby, in the cases

considered here, 𝛽𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. The D’s entitlement in the second stage is assumed to be
1+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑏𝑏

𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = �

2

� 𝑍𝑍 − 𝛽𝛽(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 ).

Thus, in the prior two-stage D game where 𝛽𝛽 = 1 and efficiency plays no role, 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = 𝑍𝑍�2 − 𝑋𝑋 +
𝑥𝑥 + 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 , which, as before, splits the second stage sum equally and corrects any inequity from the

In fact, they are so strong in Cushman et al. that roughly one in six second stage allocators transfer the maximum
regardless of first stage actions or outcomes.
14
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first stage. In the current fair luck game where 𝛽𝛽 = 0 and only efficiency matters, 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = �

1+𝑏𝑏

where 0 < 𝑏𝑏 < 1. The highest possible payoff is 𝑍𝑍, which equals zero in games with only

2

� 𝑍𝑍,

1

punishment, and 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = 0. In games with reward, 𝑍𝑍 > 0 and 2 𝑍𝑍 < 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 < 𝑍𝑍 because 0 < 𝑏𝑏 < 1. 15
The R’s utility function in the fair luck game can, therefore, be written

(4)

𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 ) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥′) + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(𝑧𝑧, 𝛼𝛼).

This reflects R’s fixed payment from the first stage. In addition, as stated, when agents sanction
and 𝛽𝛽 = 0, efficiency is assumed to crowd out other allocative preferences, so the effect of 𝛽𝛽 on
altruism is technically included but superfluous, in this case. The final step in specifying virtue

preferences to accommodate outcome bias involves the scale, 𝑥𝑥′. So far, choices, if implemented,

have had certain consequences in the cases considered, and the scale was defined as the fair
transfer to the patient, i.e., the entitlement in the case of an unendowed patient. Now the

consequences of choices are uncertain, and outcome bias is a reflection of the dependence of
sanctions not only on choices but also outcomes. In the fair luck game, the fair allocation from
the first stage sum of 𝑋𝑋 is 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 = 𝐹𝐹, so it makes sense for this to be the scale, when intended and
realized outcomes align, whether choices are under certainty or uncertainty. In this case, I will
write the choice and realized outcome as the pair (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 ) ∈ {(𝑓𝑓, 𝐹𝐹), (𝑢𝑢, 𝑈𝑈)}. What about the

cases, when intended and realized outcomes do not agree, i.e., (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 ) ∈ {(𝑓𝑓, 𝑈𝑈), (𝑢𝑢, 𝐹𝐹)}? It is

natural, in this case, to think in terms of expected outcomes. As attempted murder is not

punished as harshly as murder, so also the scale responds to the difference between expected and
realized outcomes. And as attempted murder is punished more severely than attempted burglary,
so also the scale responds to differences in expected outcomes. I propose defining the scale in
these cases as the expected value from the choice, i.e., 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓 if the choice is fair, and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑢𝑢 if the
choice is unfair. Then, the scale of sanctions can be defined as
𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 ) ∈ {(𝑓𝑓, 𝐹𝐹), (𝑢𝑢, 𝑈𝑈)}
𝑥𝑥 = � 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 ) = (𝑓𝑓, 𝑈𝑈) .
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑢𝑢 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 ) = (𝑢𝑢, 𝐹𝐹)
′

These two theorems follow, the proofs of which may be found in Appendix 1.
THEOREM 5.1: In the fair luck game, agents in the second stage sanction, i.e., they allocate
The assumption that 𝑏𝑏 < 1 is not critical, but it makes the theoretical predictions consistent with the fact that, in
such experiments, some second stage allocators set their goal above equality but, on average, somewhat below the
maximum possible reward 𝑍𝑍.
15
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beyond what is called for by distributive preferences alone. Specifically, they reward first
stage dictators more, or punish them less, for choosing 𝑓𝑓 than for choosing 𝑢𝑢, ceteris
paribus, i.e., for a given scale, 𝑥𝑥′.

THEOREM 5.2: Choices are sanctioned, even when the intended outcomes do not obtain, but
fair choices are rewarded more strongly and unfair choices punished more strongly when
realized outcomes are aligned with choices. Sanctions for realized outcomes that agree
with expected outcomes are the same as for the same outcomes chosen with certainty.
These theorems predict most (and contradict none) of the stylized facts above as well as the
specific findings of Cushman et al. while adding a theoretical underpinning for them in terms of
fairness preferences. The theory is also consistent with the asymmetry in sanctioning in SF 5.1
from the concavity of r, but this cannot be proven for the fair luck game, given that it produces
only a binary signal of preferences. Further corroborative evidence of this specification of virtue
preferences is presented in section 6 on willful ignorance and section 7 on delegation.

6. Willful Ignorance
An important factor contributing to the 2007-08 financial crisis was the ability of lenders
to avoid documenting applicants’ incomes and, thereby, avoid knowing about the borrowers’
often inflated claims. In the accounting sandals of the early 2000s, CEOs of troubled firms like
Enron and Worldcom later professed ignorance of the dubious accounting practices at their
companies. As these examples illustrate, the economic consequences of information avoidance
can be staggering, but this phenomenon also spans other important domains. Political
polarization, for example, can be traced to the shunning of broadcast and online news sources
that uncomfortably challenge one’s preconceptions (Dahlgren, Shehata, and Strömbäck, 2019,
Peterson, Goel, and Iyengar, 2019). People often avoid information that could help them better
identify the moral, right or socially beneficial course of action, which I will call willful
ignorance. Experiments indicate that this behavior has an intrinsic component that cannot be
explained, at least not solely, by extrinsic motives such as unadulterated greed, fear of legal
culpability, or information costs.
Willful ignorance is one example of a broader class of anomalies I call “norm
avoidance.” Others include delegation, which is discussed in the following section, and moral
egress, which is analyzed in Konow (2022). Norm avoidance denotes avoiding either making a
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choice involving a salient moral norm or information about the consequences of such a choice. In
the context of dictator experiments on this topic, I make the following two assumptions.
ASSUMPTION 1: Compared to moral salience in the standard dictator game (𝜎𝜎 ℎ ), moral
salience is lower with the availability of an option to avoid taking action or acquiring

information about the consequences of one’s action (𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 ), even if the agent does not exercise the
option. Moral salience is lower still for those who actually exercise the option and choose to
avoid the action or information about the consequences of the action (𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 ).

That is, the option to avoid a moral norm, or information about its consequences, is non-moral
context, which lowers moral salience. Actually exercising that option additionally increases
separation between agent and patient and, therefore, lowers moral salience further.
ASSUMPTION 2: With norm avoidance, the effects in utility terms of different choices on
altruism are second order in magnitude to the utility effects on material utility and for all choices
are non-negative (non-positive) for altruistic (spiteful) dictators.
The examples of norm avoidance we consider involve categorical choices lacking clear
endowments, so there are no unambiguous harming options, thus, the agent’s altruism utility is
assumed to be non-negative in all patient payoffs for 𝛼𝛼 > 0 and non-positive for 𝛼𝛼 < 0. Further,
I assume in games with norm avoidance options that the effects of those options operate chiefly

through fairness and material utility, and the latter swamps the effects of different choices on the
utility from altruism.
Turning now specifically to willful ignorance, consider the example of the binary dictator
game introduced by Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007), or DWK, which I will call the “information
game.” Most subsequent studies of willful ignorance in experimental economics employ this
design or ones very close to it, although quite different designs, e.g., Serra-Garcia and Szech
(2019) and Spiekermann and Weiss (2016), have also come to similar conclusions. There are
three possible payoffs, 𝐻𝐻, 𝐹𝐹 and 𝐿𝐿, that can be paired between D,R in four ways, {𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷 , 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 }, where

0 ≤ 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐹𝐹 − 𝐿𝐿 > 𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹 (𝐻𝐻 = 6, 𝐹𝐹 = 5, 𝐿𝐿 = 1 in DWK). The sequence of decisions
and payoffs are illustrated in Figure 5. There are two states of the world, 𝜔𝜔 ∈ {1,2}, that Nature

(N) chooses with equal probability, 𝑞𝑞 = 0.5. The D first chooses whether to reveal the realization

of the gamble (R) or not (NR) and then chooses either option A or option B. If D chooses reveal,

D then finds out whether the fairer option is A or B before choosing: in state 1, this is 1B, and, in

state 2, this is 2A. As usual in a simple dictator game, fairness reduces to equality. Specifically in
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the information game, I assume the entitlement is always the patient’s payoff in the most equal
state of the overall game, which is F in this case, i.e., 𝜂𝜂 = 𝐹𝐹. This seems reasonable, it fits the
results well, and alternative assumptions (such as equality in realized payoffs) complicate the

analysis to the point that few choices can be ranked. If D chooses not to reveal, option A or B is
chosen without knowledge of the realization of the gamble, whereby the fairer option is B in
expectations. Since revealing is costless, though, D can always guarantee the fairer outcome,
although that would mean sacrificing a payoff of H should state 1 obtain. For comparison, some
studies include baseline treatments in which Ds know payoffs: the more common one relates to
state 1 and D chooses only between R1A and R1B, call them 1A and 1B, respectively; in another
the choices pertain to state 2 and are between R2A and R2B, call them 2A and 2B, respectively.

FIGURE 5. – Information game of Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007).
Consider the following stylized facts for this game. The percentages cited are averages
weighted by numbers of observations (total N=368) from six studies: DWK plus five others that
employ their design with relative payoffs that are the same or very close: Bartling, Engl and
Weber (2014), Feiler (2014, 𝑞𝑞 = 0.5, payoff sets 1 and 4), Grossman (2014, Default NR
condition), Grossman and van der Weele (2017), and Larson and Capra (2009). These

percentages as well as the acronyms for the various choices are summarized in Figure 5.

SF 6.1: In the information game, Ds are roughly equally split between those who reveal (53%)
and those who do not (47%). Of those who reveal, a majority (72%) chooses the fair
option B, if state 1 obtains (R1B), and nearly all (98%) choose option A, if state 2 obtains
(R2A). Of those who do not reveal, a large majority (89%) chooses option A (NRA). In
the baseline condition for state 1, most (69%) choose the fair option B (i.e., 1B), and, in
the one study with a baseline for state 2 (Bartling et al., 2014), almost all (96%) choose
option A (2A).
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Let the D’s choice in state 𝜔𝜔 be denoted 𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 , 𝑖𝑖 = {1,2}, where the possible choices in

each state are A or B. Then the D’s utility when the state is revealed can be written
𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 , 𝜔𝜔) = 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷 |𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 , 𝜔𝜔) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 − 𝜂𝜂|𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 , 𝜔𝜔) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 , 𝛼𝛼|𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 , 𝜔𝜔).

The D’s expected utility before knowing the state can be written

𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 , 𝜔𝜔) = 0.5 ∙ [𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷 |𝑥𝑥1 , 1) + 𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷 |𝑥𝑥2 , 2)] + 0.5 ∙ 𝜎𝜎[𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 − 𝜂𝜂|𝑥𝑥1 , 1)
+𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 − 𝜂𝜂|𝑥𝑥2 , 2) + 0.5 ∙ 𝜎𝜎[𝑔𝑔(𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 , 𝛼𝛼|𝑥𝑥1 , 1) + 𝑔𝑔(𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 , 𝛼𝛼|𝑥𝑥2 , 2)].

Applied to willful ignorance, Assumption 1 means that the option in the information game to
remain ignorant of the consequences of one’s choices lowers moral salience, even for those who
reveal (𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 ), compared to the standard game (𝜎𝜎 ℎ ), and moral salience is even lower for those
who do not reveal (𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 ).

Unlike the previously discussed reciprocity experiments and sinners and saints game,

which produce quasi-continuous measures of generosity, the information game does not produce
any cardinal measures of generosity. The information game permits only categorical choices
(whether or not to reveal, option A or B in state 1 or 2), but, unlike the fair luck game on
outcome bias, the choices number more than two, and it is not immediately clear which choices
should be considered more or less generous. Nevertheless, one can partially order choices
according to their estimated generosity from inferences about intrinsic moral motivation using
features of the theory discussed in section 2. As shown in the Theorem 6.1 below, the primary
rankings here are according to the fairness coefficient. Experimental evidence on the resulting
rankings comes later from third party sanctioning of choices. Moreover, coupled with Theorem
6.2 below, that evidence is shown to be highly consistent with both the predicted ranking of
choices and the theory of virtue preferences.
The following theorem explains those findings in SF 6.1 involving (near) unanimity and
provides a partial ordering of choices. The proof is located in Appendix 1.
Theorem 6.1: In the information game, if Ds do not reveal, option A (NRA) dominates (is strictly
preferred to) option B (NRB). If Ds reveal and state 2 obtains, option A (R2A) dominates
option B (R2B); R2B might only be chosen if there are very spiteful Ds. The fairest Ds
reveal and choose the fairer option B if state 1 obtains (R1B), and the least fair Ds reveal
and choose the less fair option A if state 1 obtains (R1A). In the baseline condition for
state 1, fairer Ds choose B (1B) over A (1A). In the baseline condition for state 2, A (2A)
dominates B (2B); 2B might only be chosen if there are very spiteful Ds. The estimated
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generosity of choices 𝐶𝐶, 𝛾𝛾� 𝐶𝐶 , can be ranked for dominant and dominated choices:

For dominant choices: 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴 ; 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴 ; 𝛾𝛾� 1𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾� 1𝐴𝐴 ;
For dominated choices: 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵 ; 𝛾𝛾� 2𝐴𝐴 > 𝛾𝛾� 2𝐵𝐵 .

Proof: See Appendix 1.

Two choices, R2B and 2B, are predicted to be dominated, which results from Assumption

2. The fact that they are almost never chosen (only 2% and 4%, respectively) justifies this
assumption, but these choices can, nevertheless, be ranked, because they would be chosen, if Ds
were more spiteful than they, in practice, are. Nevertheless, one of the ten choices in the
experiment, viz., NRB, cannot be ranked, because it is predicted always to be dominated.
Although a large majority of Ds chooses NRA, roughly one in ten chooses NRB. Corollary 6.1
offers a means to rank this choice that is also consistent with a fraction of Ds choosing NRA.
Corollary 6.1: If some Ds in the information game value equality in final payoffs, then among
them fairer Ds choose NRB, i.e., 𝛾𝛾� 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.

Proof: See Appendix 1.

As explained previously, the analysis otherwise rests on the assumption that Ds associate fairness
with the most equal payoff in the overall game, an assumption that enables a more extensive set
of rankings of generosity and comports well with the results. But allowing for a few Ds, who
value equal final payoffs, permits us to rank NRB and is consistent with its infrequent choice.
Bartling, Engl and Weber (2014, or BEW henceforth) adapted the DWK design,
adjusting the payoffs while maintaining the fundamental relative relationships between L, F and
H. They also added third party punishment of the D using the strategy method and based on D
choices to reveal or not and of option A or B as well as of the realized payoffs. In their design,
the possibility of punishment was common knowledge, and third parties paid a small price to
punish. Below I analyze a simplified non-strategic version of third-party punishment in the
information game, e.g., punishment by unannounced spectators. This makes the analysis more
tractable while producing conclusions that should be qualitatively the same in light of several
facts: actual punishment in BEW never changes the ranking of expected payoffs across fair and
unfair choices relative to pre-punishment payoffs, the price of punishment in BEW is only $0.10
per unit, and the third parties punish consistently with the ranking of choices from the nonstrategic analysis here.
The following theorem states predictions about spectator punishment in this game.
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Theorem 6.2: In the information game, suppose that F, which is the maximum threshold for
generosity of any Ds, is the 𝛾𝛾� for a fraction of spectators. Then, the ideal sanction of Ds by

spectators, 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝐶𝐶𝜔𝜔 , varies according to D choice, C, and, in the case of NRA and NRB, realized
state, 𝜔𝜔 ∈ {1,2}, and can be ranked across choices and states as follows:
0 = 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴

0 = 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵

𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1

𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1
0 = 𝑧𝑧̃ 1𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 1𝐴𝐴

𝑧𝑧̃ 2𝐴𝐴 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 2𝐵𝐵

Proof: See Appendix 1.
The assumptions about 𝛾𝛾� allow one to conclude there will be no punishment of R1B and 1B but
some punishment, if only minor, of other choices.

Table 6 presents the results from BEW on sanctions by D choice and, in the Not reveal
cases, realization of state. Punishment is expressed in negative terms as punishment points and in
order of increasing punishment from left to right. The top rubric summarizes the results for the
information game and the bottom rubric the results for the baseline treatments. The results are
consistent with all theoretical predictions. Punishment in R1B and 1B is effectively zero, and,
although theory cannot produce a complete ordering across all twelve cases, the levels of
punishment are consistent with all predicted partial orderings.
R1B

R2A

NRB1

NRB2

NRA2

R2B

NRA1

R1A

-0.58

-2.67

-4.42

-6.00

-8.00

-9.50

-11.42

-16.25

1B

2A

2B

1A

-0.56

-1.76

-12.41

-19.72

TABLE 6
PUNISHMENT POINTS IN BARTLING, ENGL AND WEBER (2014)
Numerous explanations have been offered for information avoidance, e.g., see the
excellent review of Golman, Hagmann and Loewenstein (2017). On the more specific topic of
willful ignorance, which as used here involves a connection to moral preferences, Gino, Norton
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and Weber (2016) explain willful ignorance based on motivated reasoning, i.e., ignorance allows
selfish dictators to believe they are being moral. This seems consistent with other evidence of
self-serving fairness biases, e.g., Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer (1995),
Konow (2000), although I am unaware of any evidence on the incentivized elicitation of moral
beliefs in the specific case of willful ignorance. Along other lines, Grossman and van der Weele
(2017) propose a theory of self-image that is consistent with D behavior in the information game.
They argue persuasively in favor of an explanation based on self-signaling, although it is unclear
how that theory might explain patterns of third-party punishment. As I see it, though, the main
arguments for moral salience are its parsimony and broad range of applications, while being
potentially complementary to, rather than conflicting with, alternative explanations such as
motivated reasoning and self-image.

7. Delegation
Numerous management consulting firms exist largely to recommend or carry out the
firing of the employees of their client companies, even though those companies could implement
the firings themselves and, thereby, save themselves the consulting fees. Companies in
developed nations outsource much of their manufacturing to companies in less developed
countries where labor standards are lower, even though there might, in some cases, be cost
advantages from vertically integrating foreign production. When decision-makers delegate such
choices, it raises the question of whether they seek to deflect blame from themselves for
undesirable consequences, say, from their personal involvement in firings or from dangerous
work conditions, such as those that led to the collapse of the Rana Plaza textiles factory building
in Bangladesh in 2013 that killed more than 1100 workers. In fact, economics experiments
corroborate the desire of agents to delegate immoral choices to others after ruling out other
reasons, including liability concerns, the value of outside expertise and advantages of
specialization.
Experimenters have studied delegation chiefly using dictator games in which a dictator
may delegate to an intermediary (I) the decision about the payoffs of the D, R(s), and I. There
have been wide variations, though, in features of the designs, such as continuous or binary
choices, single shot or multiple rounds, communication between subjects or not, differing
numbers of subjects in groups, fixed matching or rematching of groups, selection of Is, different
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opportunities for punishment and of different members of groups, etc. Nevertheless, certain
patterns are robust across these designs and are summarized in the following stylized facts.
SF 7.1: When dictators have an option to delegate, average allocations to recipients are lower
than in a standard dictator game. Some dictators delegate the allocation decision to
intermediaries, who usually choose unfair allocations, and fewer dictators make fair
allocations directly themselves (Hamman, Loewenstein and Weber, 2010, Coffman,
2011, Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012, Oexl and Grossman, 2013).

FIGURE 6. – Delegation game of Bartling and Fischbacher (2012).
For the analysis, I focus on a simple, non-strategic design, which I will call the
“delegation game,” that was introduced by Bartling and Fischbacher (2012, henceforth BF) and
that has been used and adapted by others, e.g., Oexl and Grossman (2013). Each group of four
consists of a D, an I, and two Rs, whose payoffs, {𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷 , 𝜋𝜋𝐼𝐼 , 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅1 , 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅2 }, can be fair, {𝐹𝐹, 𝐹𝐹, 𝐹𝐹, 𝐹𝐹}, or

unfair, {𝐻𝐻, 𝐻𝐻, 𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿}, where 0 ≤ 𝐿𝐿 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐻𝐻 = 2𝐹𝐹 (𝐻𝐻 = 9, 𝐹𝐹 = 5, 𝐿𝐿 = 1 in BF). The
sequence of decisions and payoffs are illustrated in Figure 6. The D chooses either to allocate

directly or to delegate the decision to an I, whereby the D is assumed to estimate the probability
that the I will allocate fairly to be 𝑞𝑞, where 0 < 𝑞𝑞 < 1. There is also a baseline treatment with no
delegation option that corresponds to the Allocate branch of the game tree. Clearly, standard

theory predicts that a risk neutral or risk averse D will never delegate, since allocating directly

guarantees the fair or unfair outcome preferred by D. BF include treatments with punishment that
produce high rates of fair choices, likely motivated by strategic self-interest. But in their nonstrategic treatments of the delegation game without punishment, 66% of Ds choose unfair, 17%
choose fair, and 17% choose to delegate, whereby 82% of Is then choose the unfair allocation. In
the baseline dictator game, 65% of Ds choose unfair, almost identical to that in the delegation
game, but that means that the percentage of Ds choosing fair directly drops from 35% in the
baseline to only 17% in the delegation game. Thus, the delegation option appears to lead about
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one-half of otherwise fair Ds to delegate.
Applied to the delegation game, Assumption 1 means that the very existence of an option
to delegate the decision in the delegation game to an intermediary lowers moral salience (𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 )

relative to the standard dictator game (𝜎𝜎 ℎ ), and moral salience is lower still for those who

actually choose to delegate (𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 ). D’s uncertainty about I’s choice might magnify the impact of

intermediation through the previously discussed moral uncertainty, but delegation alone has been
shown to affect behavior in the predicted manner even in the absence of uncertainty (e.g., see
results in Study 1 of Coffman, 2011). 16 The moral salience experienced by the intermediary, 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 ,

should lie within a range: since I is aware of the delegation option, salience should be no greater
than 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 , but, the actual selection of the delegation option might reduce the sense of moral

responsibility of both D and I by a common degree to 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 . Hence, I assume that 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 ∈ [𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 , 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 ].

Since choices are categorical and not related in obvious ways to generosity, I proceed as with

willful ignorance by inferring the generosity of different choices theoretically based on intrinsic
moral preferences. In the delegation game, choices can be ranked based on fairness preferences
alone to produce estimated generosity, 𝛾𝛾�𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 , where G equals the baseline (B), allocation by the D
in the delegation game (A), or delegation by the D in the delegation game (D), C represents fair
(F) or unfair (U) in the cases where the subject makes that choice directly (i.e., omitted in the

case of the Ds who delegate), and P indicates that the estimated generosity refers to that of the
dictator (D) or intermediary (I).
Theorem 7.1: In the delegation game, the fairest dictators choose to allocate fairly themselves,
less fair ones delegate, and the least fair allocate unfairly themselves. Fewer dictators
choose to allocate fairly in the delegation game than in the standard dictator game. The
fraction of intermediaries allocating fairly is greater than or equal to the fraction of Ds
choosing to allocate fairly in the delegation game and strictly less than the fraction of fair
Ds in the baseline. Estimated generosity can be ranked as follows:
For dictators: 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ; 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
For intermediaries: 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ≥ 𝛾𝛾�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ; 𝛾𝛾�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ≥ 𝛾𝛾�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 .

One question is whether to treat I as an agent or a patient. In the latter, but not the former, case, I’s allocations
must be included in the moral preferences of the D. In the baseline, it seems clear that I is wholly passive and,
therefore, a patient. The same is true when the D chooses directly in the delegation game. For simplicity and
consistency, therefore, and because the results do not depend qualitatively on this call, I is treated everywhere as a
patient.

16
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Proof: See Appendix 1.
These predictions are consistent with the patterns observed in the BF treatments discussed above.
Some Ds allocate fairly in the baseline (35%). When delegation is an option in the delegation
game, some delegate and the fraction of fair Ds falls (17%) to a level below the fraction of fair
Ds in the baseline and roughly equal to the fraction of fair Is (18%), suggesting 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 is close to 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 .
Many experimental studies of delegation also include the possibility of subsequent

punishment of dictator decisions. Some of these results are summarized in the following SF.

SF 7.2: In the delegation game, there is no significant punishment of fair choices, regardless of
delegation. Dictators are punished significantly less for unfair allocations that result from
delegation than from their own decisions, but delegation increases punishment of
intermediaries for unfair choices (Coffman, 2011, Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012, Oexl
and Grossman, 2013).
The following theorem considers costless punishment in the delegation game assuming
non-strategic D choices as with unanticipated spectator punishment.
Theorem 7.2: In the delegation game, suppose that F, which is the maximum threshold for
generosity of any Ds, is the 𝛾𝛾� for at least some spectators. Then, spectators do not punish
those who choose fair directly or those who do not choose, but, depending on their

threshold for generosity, 𝛾𝛾�, might punish some choices in the five remaining cases, which
can be ranked as follows:

𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 , 𝑧𝑧̃𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 .

Proof: See Appendix 1.

These imply, among other things, stronger punishment of unfair allocations that are directly
chosen in the baseline or in the delegation game than those resulting from delegation. Since the
threshold for generosity is an empirical question, certain unfair choices might not be punished,
such as a D’s choosing to delegate, which is the most generous unfair choice.
I am unaware of any delegation experiment with unannounced spectator punishment, but
in some treatments of BF, a randomly chosen R could pay a fixed fee of one point to assign up to
seven punishment points to each of the other three subjects for each possible decision (i.e., using
the strategy method). In these treatments, punishment was common knowledge, which
potentially confounds inferences about the motives behind D choices because of possible
strategic self-interest. Nevertheless, if R estimates of D types in these treatments produces the
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same ranking of Ds as that of unannounced spectators, then the results remain qualitatively the
same. Thus, this comparison must be taken with a grain of salt, but these results are worth
examining given the negligible cost of punishment in BF, the absence of a compelling reason to
believe the possibility of strategic self-interest would undo rankings of Ds, and the consistency
of predictions with the patterns observed in this study. The results for punishment in the BF
experiment are summarized in Table 7 and are consistent with the predictions of Theorem 7.2.
Punishment is negligible when choices are fair or when subjects do not choose, and direct
choices of unfair, whether by Ds or Is, are punished more strongly than delegated ones. As
predicted, when the D delegates, the D’s punishment is greater, if the I subsequently chooses
unfair than fair, since the scale of the former is F and that of the latter only 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 𝑢𝑢 , indeed, 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is
negligible. But the overall level of punishment of the D with delegation is very modest,

suggesting the spectator threshold for generosity is such that they do not, on average, consider
delegation a very unfair choice.
Fair

Unfair

Dictator

Intermed

Dictator

Intermed

Dictator Game:

BF/D

BF/I

BU/D

BU/I

Baseline

-0.41

-0.34

-3.70

-0.42

Delegation Game:

AF/D

AF/I

AU/D

AU/I

Allocate

-0.19

-0.15

-4.27

-0.75

Delegation Game:

DF/D

DF/I

DU/D

DU/I

Delegate

-0.24

-0.20

-1.31

-3.96

TABLE 7
PUNISHMENT POINTS IN BARTLING AND FISCHBACHER (2012)

8. Moral Point Salience
So far, moral salience has referred in this paper to what is more properly called moral set
salience, but now we turn briefly to what I will call moral point salience. As I use the terms here,
set salience relates to properties of disjoint subsets of the decision context, viz., moral and nonmoral context, whereas point salience refers to individual elements of the context. The latter
provides a simple explanation for the well-established pattern from economics experiments of
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atoms at certain points in choice distributions. I will discuss three examples of actions that are
chosen with greater frequency than alternative choices in their neighborhood. I believe these are
important examples of point salience, but I do not claim that this is necessarily an exhaustive list.
First, equal splits are a frequent choice in many experiments, such as in ultimatum and dictator
games (Camerer, 2003). Second, zero transfers have also emerged as a frequent choice in
dictator experiments where taking options rule out a corner solution as the sole explanation, e.g.,
List (2007), Cappelen et al. (2013b), and Alevy et al. (2014). Finally, many studies have found
that, when certain actions are explicitly highlighted (e.g., actions of previous subjects,
experimenter suggestions, actions of role models), they tend to be chosen more frequently,
including in dictator games, e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), public good games, e.g.,
Croson and Marks (2001), COVID-19-related contributions and volunteering, e.g., Abel and
Brown (2020), and field experiments on charitable contributions, e.g., Shang and Croson (2009).
Researchers have explained or modeled these patterns in various ways, but each account
has its limitations, and I am unaware of a unified explanation for all three. For example,
theoretical explanations for equal splits include a kinked inequality aversion term (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999), infinite inequity aversion on the part of some subjects (e.g., Konow, 2000), or a
signaling game in which agents value social image (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). A strength
of the first approach is that it provides a simple explanation for results from numerous bargaining
and market experiments, but it is inconsistent with other findings, such as the frequent choice of
transfers between zero and one-half in dictator experiments. The second approach accounts for
the heterogeneity of types according to their degree of inequity aversion observed in many
experiments and also accommodates concepts of equity other than equality, but it is inconsistent
with variation in the percentage of subjects making equitable choices, for example, with the price
of giving (Andreoni and Miller, 2002). The third approach offers a persuasive account for equal
splits in the dictator game that avoids seemingly ad hoc assumptions about non-differentiability
of utility, but it relies on a complicated theoretical apparatus the extension of which to other
games is not straightforward. Moreover, none of these approaches provides explanations for all
three examples above. Zero transfers, even in dictator games with taking, might be explained by
dictators, who experience an endowment effect, but that explanation does nothing to account for
the first or third examples. The masses at highlighted choices can be understood as focal points
that facilitate coordination in strategic games, but that does not explain masses at dominated
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choices in non-strategic decisions. One might invoke experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010),
but they also do not provide a coherent and unified explanation for all three effects.
Moral point salience offers a simple and parsimonious account for these three types of
masses based on salience and moral norms. Specifically, it concerns elements, P, of the set of
actions, X, that are, for moral reasons, more salient than other elements of X, whereby 𝑃𝑃 ⊂ 𝑋𝑋.

Moral point salience is a term applied to fairness preferences, f, of an agent i and takes the form:
𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑃𝑃
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥) = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ≥ 1 if
.
𝑥𝑥 ∉ 𝑃𝑃
1
That is, morally salient actions may be more heavily weighted in some agents’ fairness

preferences than other elements of the set of actions, whereby the weight can vary by person.
This discontinuity in utility can prove irksome, and, in fact, the analysis in this paper thus
far has not required point salience to be invoked, largely for that reason. Without point salience,
the theory has been applied to explain a wide range of classic and anomalous results while
retaining differentiability of the utility function. Nevertheless, point salience is helpful to account
for masses that often materialize when examining the distribution of choices. So, I wish to
outline and justify briefly the position that moral point salience not only earns first place in an
Occam’s razor contest to explain such masses but also that it is also a persuasive part of a
coherent morals-based framework. I propose three categories of moral point salience below.
First, norm salience, where 𝜂𝜂 ∈ 𝑃𝑃, is the most intuitive type of moral point salience.

When first hearing about the standard dictator or ultimatum game, I suspect almost everyone
thinks the same thing: the morally right choice is to split the stakes equally. We can torture

ourselves for alternative, and more elegant, explanations, but I believe the most compelling one
is staring us in the face: the morally preferred choice is obvious, in this case. I take obvious to
imply, formally, that there is a discrete decrement in utility for making another choice, or,
equivalently, a discrete increment for making the morally obvious choice. Of course,
stakeholders, such as dictators or proposers, might make another choice due to self-interest, but,
as stated in Assumption 3, the moral norm, 𝜂𝜂, can be identified from the choices of spectators. A
concrete and intuitive way to operationalize this is to associate the entitlement in experiments
with the modal choice of spectators and the salience of the entitlement as being in direct

proportion to spectator consensus, specifically, whereby consensus can be conceptualized as
inversely related to variance in spectator judgments as proposed in Konow (2009).
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FIGURE 7. – Moral point salience.
Sources: Konow. Saijo and Akai (2020) stakeholders (a) and spectators (b), List (2007) Take $5 (c) and Earnings
(d), Adena, Huck and Rasul (2014) No suggestion and €100 (e), and Edwards and List (2014) No ask, $20 ask and
Unusual ask (f).
As previously discussed, the norm defaults to equality in simple decision contexts, like
the standard dictator game. In fact, equal splits emerge frequently in most of the games examined
in this paper. But what if the norm is not as simple and obvious as equality? As argued in section
3, when the context provides information relevant to other norms, behavior shifts towards those
norms, but does that produce masses at those norms? Consider a more demanding test of norm
salience based on a more complicated rule: equity calls for allocations that are proportional to
contributions that differ across agents. Figure 7 summarizes results from experiments that
illustrate this rule. In Konow, Saijo and Akai (2020), subjects first perform a real effort task, and
then dictators allocate the resulting earnings. Panel a shows the amounts stakeholding dictators
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allocate to recipients, and panel b shows the amounts spectators allocate to one member of each
pair. Specifically, the horizontal axis represents the difference in points allocated to recipients
from the amount they produced, which is their entitlement and the equitable amount. The mode
and choice of 50% of stakeholders in panel a and of 52% of spectators in panel b is the equitable
amount. Thus, in general, with norm salience, 𝑃𝑃 is a rule and 𝑥𝑥 a point that might be conditioned

on another variable in the context. For example, when the norm is equity, x is conditioned on

individual contributions, and when the norm is basic needs, it is conditioned on individual needs.
Konow (2001) and Konow, Saijo and Akai (2020) argue that equality is the norm by default,
when there is no or insufficient information to apply principles that depart from equality.
Second, null salience is the salience of inaction, i.e., the choice neither to help nor to
harm, such as neither giving nor taking in a dictator game, denoted 0 ∈ 𝑃𝑃. Null salience is

related to the distinction in ethics between sins of commission for the wrongs one chooses versus
sins of omission for the acts one should perform but does not. Various experiments in economics
and psychology suggest people have a stronger aversion to acts of commission than to ones of
omission (e.g., Cox, Servátka, and Vadovič, 2017, Spranca, Minsk, and Baron, 1991). That is, an
individual, who otherwise might prefer to harm another, say, take $1 in a dictator game, might
experience a discontinuity in the marginal moral disutility of doing so. One way to model this is
with moral point salience, where utility is discretely greater at zero. Of course, in many
experiments, such as the standard dictator game, a mass at zero logically emerges as a corner
solution due to selfish, spiteful or insufficiently fair dictators. But such censoring is not a
problem in dictator games with taking, and, in fact, those studies typically also find a mass at
zero. This is illustrated in panels c and d of Figure 7, which depict the Take $5 and Earnings
treatments, respectively, of List (2007), and show between 30% and 66% of dictators choosing
inaction, i.e., transfers of zero. 17
Third, and finally, threshold salience refers to the action, 𝑥𝑥� ∈ 𝑃𝑃, that corresponds to the

agent’s preferred character threshold, 𝛾𝛾�, given the context and its moral set salience. Remember
that 𝑥𝑥� is the action that is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy and that it is less than the

objectively fair transfer, 𝜂𝜂, if salience is below a sufficiently high level. Thus, this can be thought
Another way this could be modeled is as a kink in the altruism function at zero. This is consistent with a mass at
zero but one disadvantage of this approach is that a kink is not consistent with the paucity of transfers typically
observed just above and just below zero whereas point salience is.
17
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of as the action that is “fair enough” given the context. In the case of a stakeholder, we can think
of this as the stakeholder’s (potentially biased) belief about what constitutes “fair enough.” The
current theory assumes heterogeneity in the value of 𝛾𝛾�, even among spectators, so it is not clear
why a mass would materialize at any particular stakeholder choice. But experimental evidence

establishes that beliefs about the sufficient level of norm compliance, 𝑥𝑥�, are malleable and can be

manipulated, e.g., Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) and Bicchieri, Dimant, Gächter and Nosenzo
(2020). Indeed, compliance with norms responds to and sometimes coalesces around

information, including about past trusting behavior of others (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe,
1995), recommended contributions to a public good (e.g., Croson and Marks, 2001) and default
levels of transfers to recipients in dictator games (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). Such
evidence is consistent with an effect of specific information on beliefs about appropriate norm
compliance and, as a result, on behavior itself.
Voluntary contributions to charities or public goods lend themselves to examination of
this effect, since many people feel morally obliged to donate but plausibly have non-degenerate
distributions of beliefs about the appropriate amount. Studies of such contributions that include
suggested donations yield evidence consistent with threshold salience. Panel e of Figure 7 shows
contributions to a public good (viz., an opera house) in a field experiment of Adena, Huck and
Rasul (2014). When solicitations explicitly suggest a €100 contribution, the fraction of such
donations is significantly greater than that when no suggestion is made (p<0.001), according to
the two-tail z-tests used in all comparisons here. 18 The results of the field experiment of Edwards
and List (2014) on alumni donations to a university are summarized in panel f of Figure 7. The
fraction of $20 contributions is significantly greater (p<0.001), when that amount is explicitly
stated in solicitations. A further treatment in which solicitations suggest unusual amounts, like
$20.01 or $20.04, produce a similar increase in the frequency of choices of stated amounts
(p<0.001), corroborating the robustness of this effect, even when suggestions are not round
numbers.
An advantage of the way these three types of moral point salience are formulated is that
they can be specified and identified empirically. Norm salience can be inferred from spectator
A further treatment shows that, when solicitations suggest €200, the effect dissipates. This seems consistent with
agents having prior beliefs about the distribution of appropriate donations, whereby suggestions provide signals that
impact 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 in direct relationship to their proximity to priors such that outlier suggestions are ineffectual. Nevertheless,
formal analysis of this question goes beyond the scope of this paper.
18
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choices, null salience defines itself, and threshold salience can be inferred from behavioral
responses to information or from incentivized elicitation of beliefs. This discussion on moral
point salience indicates some commonsensical concepts to account for masses that are not a part
of the theory of moral set salience and indicates possible avenues for future research.

9. Conclusions
This paper proposes a tractable theory to explain not only classic results on allocative
preferences and reciprocity but also a wide range of anomalous findings about moral behavior,
including moral proximity, moral uncertainty, the outcome bias, the taking effect, joy of
destruction, moral egress, willful ignorance and delegation. At various stages, I have discussed
alternative explanations for specific phenomena, such as experimental artefacts (e.g., Bardsley,
2008), motivated reasoning (e.g., Gino et al., 2016) and image concerns (e.g., Andreoni and
Bernheim, 2009), including what I see as the strengths of those alternatives. As stated at the start,
the goal is not to dismiss or conduct a beauty contest with other accounts of specific phenomena.
Instead, one goal was to present an until now neglected explanation, which plausibly sweeps up
much of the variance in observed behavior. Another goal was to illustrate the theory’s flexibility
and ease of application, that is, to argue its appeal on the basis of Occam’s razor. A related aim
was to demonstrate the generality of the theory across an unprecedented set of sometimes
enigmatic empirical results on moral preferences. Finally, the theory was tested out-of-sample
and its predictions corroborated in a new experiment.
Future research could explore possible roles for moral salience and virtue preferences in
relation to other types of moral preferences apart from allocative preferences, e.g., trust,
trustworthiness, honesty, and cooperation. Further work could also analyze the factors that affect
how different moral and non-moral contexts might be integrated across different decisions at a
point in time as well as over time. That is, one could examine the effects on moral salience of
presenting similar decisions while varying the moral and non-moral context, which could, for
example, account for order effects. In addition, this paper focused on non-strategic decisionmaking in order to simplify the analysis and avoid factors that might confound inferences about
the forces being studied. But future work might extend the theory to situations involving
strategic interaction, such as bargaining. A theory incorporating moral salience and virtue
preferences could be applied to decision-making in experimental games, like the ultimatum
48

game, trust game, moonlighting game, centipede game, and public good games.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
Note below that primes denote derivatives and, in the case of 𝑔𝑔, partial derivatives with respect
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑔𝑔�
to 𝑥𝑥, e.g., 𝑔𝑔′ ≡ �𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 and 𝑔𝑔′′ ≡
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 2
Proof of Theorem 3.1
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = −𝑢𝑢′ (𝑥𝑥 + 𝑍𝑍 − 𝑧𝑧) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 ′ �𝑧𝑧 − 𝑍𝑍 + 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�) 𝑋𝑋� + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔′ (𝑥𝑥, 𝛼𝛼) = 0.
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
2
2
2
Substituting 𝑧𝑧(𝑥𝑥) and differentiating,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑋𝑋
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
−𝑢𝑢′′ + 𝑢𝑢′′ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 ′′ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 − 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 ′′ − 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 ′′ 𝑟𝑟 ′ 2 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔′′ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 0,
′′

′′

′′ ′ 𝑋𝑋

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = 𝑢𝑢 +𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 +𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑟 �2.
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑢𝑢′′ +𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 ′′ +𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔′′
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
If 𝑥𝑥 is randomly assigned, then 𝑟𝑟 = 0 and 0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 < 1.

Otherwise, 𝑟𝑟 ′ > 0 and sanctioning increases the value of 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 ′ �𝑧𝑧 − 𝑍𝑍 + 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�) ∙ 𝑋𝑋� = 0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
2 2
2
𝑍𝑍 𝑋𝑋
𝑋𝑋
⟹ 𝑧𝑧 = − + 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�)
2 2
2
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = 1 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃′(𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�) 𝑋𝑋
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
2

which equals 1, if 𝑥𝑥 is randomly assigned and 𝑟𝑟 = 0, and is greater than 1, if 𝑥𝑥 is chosen and
𝑟𝑟′ > 0. Note also that
′′ 𝑋𝑋
𝑑𝑑2 𝑧𝑧�
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 2 = 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 2 < 0 ⟹ asymmetric sanctioning.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Define salience in the reference state to be at the level of a given first stage sinner and saints
game, 𝜎𝜎�. Moreover, suppose, as usual, that 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 > 𝛾𝛾 and 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 < 𝛾𝛾̅ . Then
�
𝛾𝛾

�
𝛾𝛾

⎧ � 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾(𝛾𝛾)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�� 𝜌𝜌(𝛾𝛾)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻
⎪ 𝛾𝛾𝐻𝐻
𝛾𝛾𝐻𝐻
𝑥𝑥(𝜎𝜎�) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 < 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻
𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥) =
⎨ 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿
𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿
⎪� 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾(𝑦𝑦)𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾�� 𝜌𝜌(𝑦𝑦)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿
𝛾𝛾
⎩ 𝛾𝛾
The first order condition is
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 ′ �𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑍𝑍� = 0
𝑧𝑧
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
2
𝑍𝑍 𝑋𝑋 𝑌𝑌
𝑍𝑍
⇒ 𝑧𝑧 = − − + 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙
2 2 2
2
When 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 < 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 , 𝛾𝛾� = 𝑥𝑥, and
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = 1 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 ′ (𝑥𝑥� − 𝑥𝑥�) 𝑍𝑍, and
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
2
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𝑍𝑍
′′
𝑑𝑑2 𝑧𝑧�
=
𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟
< 0.
2
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
2
When 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 ,
𝑍𝑍 𝑋𝑋 𝑌𝑌
𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧̃ � 𝐿𝐿 = − − + 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 ) − 𝛾𝛾�)
2 2 2
2
𝑥𝑥
𝑍𝑍 𝑋𝑋 𝑌𝑌
𝑍𝑍
< 𝑧𝑧̃ � 𝐿𝐿 = − − + 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 (𝛾𝛾 𝐿𝐿 − 𝛾𝛾�)
𝛾𝛾
2 2 2
2
𝐿𝐿 )
since 𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥 < 𝛾𝛾 𝐿𝐿 .
When 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 ,
𝑍𝑍 𝑋𝑋 𝑌𝑌
𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧̃ � 𝐻𝐻 = − − + 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 ) − 𝛾𝛾�)
2 2 2
2
𝑥𝑥
𝑍𝑍 𝑋𝑋 𝑌𝑌
𝑍𝑍
𝐻𝐻
> 𝑧𝑧̃ � 𝐻𝐻 = − − + 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾 − 𝛾𝛾�)
𝛾𝛾
2 2 2
2
𝐻𝐻 )
since 𝛾𝛾�(𝑥𝑥 > 𝛾𝛾 𝐻𝐻 . This implies 𝑧𝑧̃ is concave in 𝑥𝑥 with a discontinuous decrease at 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 and a
discontinuous increase at 𝑥𝑥 𝐻𝐻 . From Konow (2022), we have Assumption 7, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 < 0,
Definition 1, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 < 0, and by Theorem 2.2, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 > 0. Then if a D gives 𝛾𝛾� at the reference
salience 𝜎𝜎�, then increasing 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 increases the threshold transfer in the sinners and saints game:
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥��
=
>0
𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿
for interior solutions. Note that 𝑥𝑥(𝛾𝛾�, 𝜎𝜎), so if 𝑥𝑥 is held constant,
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾� +
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎 = 0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾�
⇒

�
𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾

�
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

= 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 = − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 < 0 since

�𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾
𝑥𝑥
�
for interior solutions. Then
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾�
𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾� 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
� =
<0
𝐿𝐿
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿
�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
and 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 = 𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾� 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 < 0 since 𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾� > 0.

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

�
𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾

=1

Proof of Theorem 4.2

𝑍𝑍
𝑍𝑍
+ 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 (𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 ) − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�(𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 )� ∙ �
2
2
𝑍𝑍
𝑍𝑍
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 ′ �𝑧𝑧 − + 𝜂𝜂 (𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 ) − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�(𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 )� ∙ � = 0
𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
2
2
𝑍𝑍
𝑍𝑍
⇒ 𝑧𝑧 = − 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 (𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 ) + 𝑥𝑥 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃�𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�(𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 )� ∙ ))
2
2
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥
𝑍𝑍
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
�
� = − 𝐿𝐿 − 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 ′ �𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥�(𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 )� ∙ ∙ 𝐿𝐿 < 0.
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿 𝑥𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
2 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 �𝑧𝑧 −

Proof of Theorem 5.1
Since 𝛽𝛽 = 0,
1+𝑏𝑏
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 ) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 �𝑧𝑧 − 2 𝑍𝑍 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥 ′ �.
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑓𝑓 ′ �𝑧𝑧 − 1 + 𝑏𝑏 𝑍𝑍 − 𝜃𝜃 ∙ 𝑟𝑟(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥 ′ � = 0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
2
1+𝑏𝑏
⟹ 𝑧𝑧 = 𝑧𝑧 𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥 ′ .

Distributive preferences imply the fixed amount
corresponding 𝑧𝑧 𝑓𝑓 > 𝑧𝑧 𝑢𝑢 for a given value of 𝑥𝑥 ′ .

1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧

𝑍𝑍. The fact that 𝛾𝛾� 𝑓𝑓 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑢𝑢 implies the

Proof of Theorem 5.2
Let 𝑧𝑧 𝑥𝑥,𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 be the R’s choice of 𝑧𝑧̃ for the D’s choice x and the realization 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟 .
1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝑧𝑧 𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 𝑓𝑓 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹, since 𝑥𝑥 ′ = 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 =
𝑧𝑧 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 =
𝑧𝑧 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 =

1+𝑏𝑏

𝑧𝑧
1+𝑏𝑏

𝑧𝑧
1+𝑏𝑏

𝑧𝑧
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 𝑢𝑢 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹, since 𝑥𝑥 ′ = 𝐹𝐹

𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 𝑓𝑓 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ (𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿), since 𝑥𝑥 ′ = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 = 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿

𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 𝑢𝑢 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ �(1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐹𝐹 + 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞� since 𝑥𝑥 ′ = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 𝑢𝑢 = (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐹𝐹 + 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞

𝑧𝑧 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 > 𝑧𝑧 as long as 𝑧𝑧 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 < 𝑍𝑍 since 𝑟𝑟 > 0 and 𝐹𝐹 > 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐿𝐿
𝑧𝑧 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 < 𝑧𝑧 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 since 𝑟𝑟 < 0 and 𝐹𝐹 > (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝐹𝐹 + 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞
If D chooses with certainty, then for Rs
1 + 𝑏𝑏
𝑈𝑈 = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝜙𝜙 �𝑧𝑧 −
𝑍𝑍 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹�
2
1+𝑏𝑏
⟹ 𝑧𝑧 = 2 𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹.
If D chooses fair,
1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑧𝑧 𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 𝑓𝑓 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑧𝑧 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 .

If D chooses unfair,
1+𝑏𝑏
𝑧𝑧 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑧𝑧 𝑍𝑍 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 𝑢𝑢 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑧𝑧 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 .

Proof of Theorem 6.1
The proof proceeds by reducing the set of optimal choices by showing that some are dominated,
and identifies thresholds for certain choices using the assumption that fairness is homogeneous in
𝜙𝜙. A partial ranking of more or less generous choices can then be identified.
6.1.1. 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 dominates 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) = 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
> 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) = 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
since 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) > 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹).
6.1.2. 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 dominates 𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵
𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) = 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵) = 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
for all altruistic and selfish Ds. This inequality is reversed only if we relax Assumption 2 about
altruism being second order and D is so spiteful (denoted 𝛼𝛼 ≪ 0) that 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) <
1
[𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻)] + 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼) < 0.
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚
6.1.3. Fairest Ds choose Reveal and B in state 1 (R1B)
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Note R2A dominates R2B if reveal and state 2 obtains, and NRA dominates NRB, if do not
reveal. So we compare the expected utility of reveal and B in state 1 and A in state 2 to NRA:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵, 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) = .5𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵) + .5𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)
. 5𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) + .5𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
> 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 − 2𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚
1
[𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻)
�
� 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) + 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
−
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹)]
+
𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙
𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙
𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵
⇒ 𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙
≡
>0
−𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)
under Assumption 2.
6.1.4. Least fair Ds choose Reveal and A in state 1 (R1A)
Compare as above, but assume D chooses A if reveals and state 1 obtains.
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴, 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) = .5𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴) + .5𝑈𝑈(𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴) > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)
𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
> 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) + 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
⇒ 𝜙𝜙 < 𝜙𝜙 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴 ≡
>0
−𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)
for the mean D and on average from assumptions about the distribution of altruism types.
6.1.5. Fairer Ds choose 1B over 1A
If, in the baseline for state 1, Ds prefer B:
𝑈𝑈(1𝐵𝐵) > 𝑈𝑈(1𝐴𝐴)
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 ℎ 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) > 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎 ℎ 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 ℎ 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
1
ℎ [𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹)] − 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) + 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
⇒ 𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙1𝐵𝐵 ≡ 𝜎𝜎
>0
−𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)
by Assumption 2.
6.1.6. 2𝐴𝐴 dominates 2𝐵𝐵
The proof for the baseline for state 2 parallels that for 6.1.2 but substituting 𝜎𝜎 ℎ for 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 :
1
ℎ [−𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹)] − 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) + 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙 2𝐴𝐴 ≡ 𝜎𝜎
≤0
−𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)
such that all Ds choose 2A unless we relax Assumption 2 and D is so spiteful (𝛼𝛼 ≪ 0) that
1
𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) < 𝜎𝜎ℎ [−𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹)] + 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)<0.

Rankings by generosity
Generosity in the information game can be estimated in ordinal terms by inferring optimal
choices according to intrinsic moral motivation. Specifically, the primary ranking is based on
values of 𝜙𝜙 for two reasons: the focus on fairness in norm avoidance and the assumed second
order effects of altruism. Moreover, recall the conclusions that transfers are increasing in 𝛼𝛼 and
𝜙𝜙 and the assumption that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝛼𝛼, 𝜙𝜙) > 0, which imply that a higher 𝜙𝜙 implies greater
generosity, ceteris paribus. An exception is super-fair choices where generosity is decreasing in
𝜙𝜙, but such choices are ruled out by design in this game where the recipient can never receive
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more than F. Specifically, the following rankings of expected generosity follow from the
threshold values of 𝜙𝜙 that are derived above:
𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴 from 6.1.1, 6.1.3 and 6.1.4.
𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴 from the fact that those choosing R2A if state 1 obtains are a
mixture of R1A and R1B types.
𝛾𝛾� 1𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾� 1𝐴𝐴 from 6.1.5.
Note that R2B and 2B are predicted to be dominated under Assumption 2. For the purposes later
of analyzing sanctioning behavior of these choices, we identify what preferences could result in
these choices, even if the negligible incidence of such choices justifies Assumption 2 and its
implications here. Specifically, R2B and 2B would only be chosen, if some Ds are so spiteful
that their spite swamps their material utility, which leads to the following rankings:
𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 > 𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵
𝛾𝛾� 2𝐴𝐴 > 𝛾𝛾� 2𝐵𝐵
Proof of Corollary 6.1
If the entitlement is an equal split of final payoffs, fairer Ds prefer NRB over NRA if
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)
𝐹𝐹+𝐿𝐿
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙 �𝐿𝐿 − 2 � + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿

> 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙 �𝐿𝐿 − 2 � + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼) + .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙 �𝐿𝐿 −
2
𝑙𝑙 [𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹)] − 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
𝜎𝜎
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
⇒ 𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙
≡ 𝐿𝐿−𝐹𝐹
>0
𝑓𝑓� 2 � − 𝑓𝑓�𝐿𝐿−𝐻𝐻
� − 𝑓𝑓�𝐹𝐹−𝐻𝐻
�
2
2
by Assumption 2 and since �𝑓𝑓�𝐿𝐿−𝐹𝐹
�� < −𝑓𝑓�𝐿𝐿−𝐻𝐻
� − 𝑓𝑓�𝐹𝐹−𝐻𝐻
�.
2
2
2
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
⇒ 𝛾𝛾�
> 𝛾𝛾�

𝐻𝐻+𝐹𝐹
�
2

+ .5𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)

Proof of Theorem 6.2
The utility function of a spectator is
𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑧𝑧̅) + 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎(𝑧𝑧 − 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥 ′ )
where 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧 = 0 since 𝛽𝛽 = 0 and 𝑧𝑧 ≤ 0.
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎′(𝑧𝑧 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�)) ∙ 𝑥𝑥 ′ ) = 0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
⇒ 𝑧𝑧̃ = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥 ′
When the payoffs of choices are known, the scale is entitlement, which is assumed to be F, i.e.,
𝑥𝑥 ′ = 𝐹𝐹. Ds who choose not to reveal are making an unfair choice in expectations, since they
could always reveal and guarantee that R receives F. In Not reveal, the scale depends on the
combination of choice and outcome as stated in section 5 on outcome bias. Specifically, if the
unfair outcome for R obtains (i.e., L), then choice matches outcome, and the scale is R’s
entitlement, F, which is the case for option A if state 1 obtains (NRA1) and option B in state 2
(NRB2). If the fair outcome obtains, then choice does not match outcome, and the scale is the
expected payoff to R, viz., 𝑥𝑥 ′ = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 𝑢𝑢 = .5𝐹𝐹 + .5𝐿𝐿 ≡ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 < 𝐹𝐹, which is the case for option A in
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state 2 (NRA2) and option B in state 1 (NRB1). Note that choices R1B and 1B are the only ones
that produce equal payoffs F and should not be punished, since the threshold for generosity, 𝛾𝛾�,
cannot exceed F (indeed, they would be rewarded by some spectators for whom 𝛾𝛾� < 𝐹𝐹 were it
not for the constraint by design that sanctions are non-positive). Then some spectators will
punish choices other than R1B and 1B with the ideal sanction varying according to 𝛾𝛾 and 𝑥𝑥 ′ as
follows:
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾 𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃ 1𝐴𝐴 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 1𝐴𝐴 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃ 1𝐵𝐵 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾 1𝐵𝐵 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃ 2𝐴𝐴 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾� 2𝐴𝐴 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃ 2𝐵𝐵 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾 2𝐵𝐵 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
From inspection of these equations and the rankings of estimated generosity of choices from
Theorem 6.1 and Corollary 6.1, we have the following rankings of the ideal sanction, 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝐶𝐶𝜔𝜔 ,
according to choice, C, and, in the case of NRA and NRB, realized state, 𝜔𝜔 ∈ {1,2}:
0 = 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴
0 = 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅1𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅1𝐴𝐴
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅2𝐴𝐴 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑅𝑅2𝐵𝐵
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1
𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1
0 = 𝑧𝑧̃ 1𝐵𝐵 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 1𝐴𝐴
𝑧𝑧̃ 2𝐴𝐴 > 𝑧𝑧̃ 2𝐵𝐵
Proof of Theorem 7.1
In the baseline, salience is high, 𝜎𝜎 ℎ , and the D chooses fair if
𝑈𝑈(𝐹𝐹) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈)
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 ℎ 3𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
> 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎 ℎ 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 ℎ 𝜙𝜙2𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 ℎ 𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻, 𝛼𝛼) + 𝜎𝜎 ℎ 2𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
1
ℎ [𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹)] + [𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻, 𝛼𝛼) + 2𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)] − 3𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ≡ 𝜎𝜎
−𝑓𝑓(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹) − 2𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)
In the delegation game, the D chooses to allocate fairly with salience 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 over delegating with
salience 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 if
𝑈𝑈(𝐹𝐹) > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐷𝐷)
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 3𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) > 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝐹𝐹) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹)
+(1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙2𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + 𝑞𝑞𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 3𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻, 𝛼𝛼) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 2𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
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1
𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 − 𝑞𝑞𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙
[𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻)
[𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻,
−
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹)]
+
𝛼𝛼)
+
2𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿,
𝛼𝛼)]
−
∙ 3𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 (1 − 𝑞𝑞)
𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙 ≡
−𝑓𝑓(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹) − 2𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)
In the delegation game, the D chooses to allocate unfairly over delegating if
𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈) > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐷𝐷)
𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙2𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻, 𝛼𝛼) + 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 2𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
> 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝐹𝐹) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝜙𝜙2𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)
+ 𝑞𝑞𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 3𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻, 𝛼𝛼) + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 2𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
𝜙𝜙 < 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ≡
1
𝑞𝑞𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙
[𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹)] + [𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻, 𝛼𝛼) + 2𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)] − 𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑙 ∙ 3𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
1 𝑚𝑚
𝜎𝜎
−
(1
−
𝑞𝑞)𝜎𝜎
𝑙𝑙
𝑙𝑙
𝜎𝜎 + 𝑞𝑞 (𝜎𝜎 − 𝜎𝜎 )
−𝑓𝑓(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹) − 2𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)
Under Assumption 2, we disregard altruism and focus on the other terms. Note 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 since
1
𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 < 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 + 𝑞𝑞 (𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 ), so Ds with 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 delegate. Note 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝜙𝜙 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 since 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 < 𝜎𝜎 ℎ ,
so fewer Ds allocated fairly in the delegation game than in the dictator game.
The thresholds above establish the following rankings of the estimated generosity of
dictators across cases:
𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ,
𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ,
where 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 and 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 by 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝜙𝜙 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 and 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 by 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 .
Finally, the intermediary chooses fair if
𝑈𝑈(𝐹𝐹) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑈𝑈)
𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 3𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
> 𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) + 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 𝜙𝜙2𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹) + 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻, 𝛼𝛼) + 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 2𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)
1
𝐼𝐼 [𝑢𝑢(𝐻𝐻) − 𝑢𝑢(𝐹𝐹)] + [𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻, 𝛼𝛼) + 2𝑔𝑔(𝐿𝐿, 𝛼𝛼)] − 3𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹, 𝛼𝛼)
𝜎𝜎
𝐼𝐼
𝜙𝜙 > 𝜙𝜙 ≡
−𝑓𝑓(𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹) − 2𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹)
For Is, the threshold value for choosing fair, 𝜙𝜙 𝐼𝐼 , is solved the same as for Ds in the baseline
(𝜙𝜙 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ) except for the replacement of 𝜎𝜎 ℎ with 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 ∈ [𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 , 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 ]. Disregarding altruism terms, 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 =
𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 ⇒ 𝜙𝜙 𝐼𝐼 = 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , and 𝜎𝜎 𝐼𝐼 = 𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 ⇒ 𝜙𝜙 𝐼𝐼 > 𝜙𝜙 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 since
1
𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 > 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 + 𝑞𝑞 (𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑙𝑙 ).
These imply the following ranking of the estimated generosity of intermediaries:
𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ≥ 𝛾𝛾�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 .

Proof of Theorem 7.2
From the proof to Theorem 6.2, the spectator’s ideal sanction is
𝑧𝑧̃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾�𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝑥𝑥 ′
applying the notation for 𝛾𝛾� in the delegation game to this equation.
When fair is chosen directly or the subject makes no choice, the theory of virtue preferences
predicts no punishment, namely, in the following cases:
𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧̃𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧̃𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧̃𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝑧𝑧̃𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝑧𝑧̃𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 0
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For the remaining five cases, the ideal punishments are:
𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 𝑢𝑢
𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹
𝑧𝑧̃𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝛾𝛾�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 𝛾𝛾�) ∙ 𝐹𝐹.
Inspecting these equations, comparing estimated generosity and noting 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 𝑢𝑢 < 𝐹𝐹, sanctions can
be ranked as follows:
𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 , 𝑧𝑧̃𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 > 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 .
Note that delegating is fairer than directly allocating unfairly, making it the most generous, 𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ,
of the unfair choices. The location of the generosity threshold is an empirical question, but if 𝛾𝛾� ≤
𝛾𝛾�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , then 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 and 𝑧𝑧̃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 will not be punished.
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Appendix 2: Not for Publication

Composite Protocol for Sinners and Saints Experiment
Key: The text below is common to all subjects except where indicated as being specific to
subject <X>, [Y] or {Z}. Notes or comments about the protocol that were not in the instructions
are in (parentheses and italicized).

Math Test

Instructions
Participants can earn a bonus in this experimental study for making decisions about the
allocation of real money. It is important, therefore, that all decision-makers first pass a test
consisting of three short questions involving addition and subtraction. You have at most two
attempts at each question to get the correct answer and to proceed to the experiment.
Please read the question below, fill in the blank with the correct answer, and then press
“Proceed” to go to the next question.

Question 1

Please complete the following subtraction problem:
43
−_____
19

Question 2

The sum of Columns 1 and 2 on Line 1 below equals −5, as seen in the final Column for Line 1.
The sum of Columns 1 and 2 on Line 2 below equals +16, as seen in the final Column for Line 2.
Please fill in the blanks under Column 2 with numbers such that these two equations are
satisfied.
Column 1
Column 2
Sum of Cols. 1 + 2
Line 1
−7
+
=
−5
Line 2

+5

Question 3

+

=

+16

Below are two equations involving two numbers, which we will call A and B. Equation 1
involves the sum of these two numbers and Equation 2 the difference between the two numbers.
Please fill in the blanks below with the numbers, A and B, such that both equations are true.
Equation 1
Equation 2
A
A
+B
−B
_____
_____
Total
62
10
The value of A is
The value of B is
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General Instructions
Task
This is an experimental study of decision-making involving the allocation of real money. In
addition to a reward of $2, which everyone receives, participants can earn a bonus, the amount of
which can depend on decisions in the experiment.
Random Assignment
Participants will be randomly assigned to different types and will be randomly matched with
other participants.
Anonymity
Participants will remain anonymous, that is, decisions and payments will be private, and no
participant will ever be told the identity of any other person with whom he or she is matched.
Now we will go over the instructions that explain your participant type and your decision.

Instructions for Person <X> [Y] {Z}
Quiz about Instructions
Please make sure you read these instructions carefully, because afterwards you must answer
some questions about them {in order to continue with the experiment. You will have at most two
attempts to answer all questions correctly, or your participation will be terminated}.
Groups
You have been randomly assigned to a group consisting of participants called Persons <X> [Y]
{Z}. Other participants have been randomly assigned to groups consisting of participants called
Persons <Y> [X] {X and Persons Y}. Each Person [<X>] {Z} is randomly matched with [<one
Person Y>] {a Pair consisting of one Person X and one Person Y}.
{Z Payment
For making a decision about X and Y, each Person Z will receive a fixed bonus of $5 ($2 in the
Benevolent dictator treatment), which is in addition to the reward of $2. The amount of Person
Z’s bonus has nothing to do with the eventual payments received by Persons X and Y.}
X and Y Endowments
Each X/Y Pair has been provisionally allocated a certain number of points we will call
“endowments,” which are in addition to their reward of $2 each. Specifically, Person X is
endowed with 15 points and Person Y is endowed with 5 points, whereby each point is always
worth $0.20 in this experiment. The difference in X and Y endowments is completely arbitrary:
in other words, participants are randomly assigned to be either Person X or Person Y, and the
difference in their endowments has nothing to do with any other differences between them.

(Double Dictator Treatments

continues below with Instructions for Person <X> [Y] {Z})
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Decision of Person X
<As Person X, your decision> {[The decision of Person X]} is to choose how many points to
transfer between Persons X and Y. {Your decision, as Person Z, will be described momentarily.}
Person Y makes no decisions. Specifically, (you) {[Person X]} may:
(the following appears only where negative transfers are possible, where L is the most negative
number)
• Transfer 1 to L points from Y to X.
• That is, <you> {[Person X]} may choose a negative transfer to Y of –1 to –L points.
(in some cases, only 1 negative point can be transferred rather than a range of points, in which
case above it reads “Transfer 1 point from Y to X”)
OR
(the following appears where zero transfers are possible in combination with positive and/or
negative transfers.)
• Leave the points of X and Y unchanged.
• That is, <you> {[Person X]} may choose a transfer to Y of 0 points.
OR
(the following appears only where positive transfers are possible, where H is the highest positive
number)
• Transfer 1 to H points from X to Y.
• That is, <you> {[Person X]} may choose a positive transfer to Y of +1 to +H points.
When you have understood these instructions, click “Continue” below to proceed to the quiz
about these instructions.

Quiz about Instructions
We now need to make sure that you have understood the instructions thus far. Please carefully
select one answer to each of the three questions below. You have at most two chances to answer
all questions correctly, or your participation will be terminated. When you are satisfied with your
answers, click “Submit” below.
Question 1
Which of the following statements about endowments is true?
A. Participants are assigned to be either Person X or Person Y based on their relative
performance on a task.
B. Person X is endowed with 5 points and Person Y with 15 points.
C. Persons X and Y are randomly assigned to their types, and the difference in their
endowments has nothing to do with any other differences between them.
Question 2
What was the value of the lowest (or minimum) possible transfer from X to Y?
Choose (This runs from -5 to +5)
Question 3
What was the value of the highest (or maximum) possible transfer from X to Y?
Choose (This runs from -1 to +15)
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<Your> [Person X’s] [<Decision>]
<Here again are the transfers you may choose for your decision. You may:
• Transfer 1 to L points from Y to X.
• That is, you may choose a negative transfer to Y of –1 to –L points.
(in some cases, only 1 negative point can be transferred rather than a range of points, in which
case above it reads “Transfer 1 point from Y to X”)
OR
(the following appears where zero transfers are possible in combination with positive and/or
negative transfers.)
• Leave the points of X and Y unchanged.
• That is, you may choose a transfer to Y of 0 points.
OR
(the following appears only where positive transfers are possible, where H is the highest positive
number)
• Transfer 1 to H points from X to Y.
• That is, you may choose a positive transfer to Y of +1 to +H points.
Click on a number in the pull-down menu below in the field marked “Choose” to try out
different values for your transfer. Below this, the Points after transfer will update for Persons X
and Y. You may revise your choice at any time before submitting it. Once you are satisfied with
your choice, click “Submit” below.>
[Below you can see a summary of the Endowments, the transfer chosen by Person X, and the
Points after transfer. Please click “Continue” below to see information about an additional
allocation.]
Endowments

[<Person X
15

<I transfer> [Person X transferred] [<this amount

Person Y
5>]
Choose

Points after transfer>]

{Further Instructions for Person Z
Quiz about Further Instructions
Please make sure you read these instructions carefully, because afterwards you must answer
some questions about them in order to continue with the experiment. You will have at most two
attempts to answer all questions correctly, or your participation will be terminated.
Decision of Person Z
Your decision as Person Z is to allocate 40 additional points between Persons X and Y. These 40
points will be added to the amounts X and Y receive after the transfer Person X makes from the
initial endowments, which total 20 points (15 to X and 5 to Y). You will be told an amount that
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Person X chooses to transfer to Person Y, and then you will allocate an amount out of the 40
additional points to Person X. Any remaining points out of the 40 that you do not allocate to
Person X will go to Person Y, so no points are lost.
Note that, at the time Person X makes their decision, Person X does not yet know about the 40
additional points or about the existence of Person Z or of any decision by Z. At the end of the
experiment after all decisions have been made, however, the other participants will be told about
Person Z and the decision by Z that applies to their payments.
Example of Z Choice
We will now go through an Example in order to familiarize you with your decision. We do not
yet know which transfer Person X will choose, but, for this Example, suppose that X chooses to
transfer +1 (or -1 if +1 is not an option in that treatment) point to Y. That is, suppose X chooses
to transfer 1 point from X to Y (or transfer 1 point from Y to X). Your decision is to choose how
to allocate the additional 40 points given this X transfer.
The table below summarizes for this Example a Transfer chosen by X and the Points of X and Y
after X’s transfer. You choose how many, if any, of the 40 additional points you wish to allocate
to X. You may try out different values from 0 to 40 to allocate to X from the pull-down menu in
the field below marked “Choose.” The amount you choose will be added to Person X’s points,
and the remaining amount from the 40 additional points will be added to Person Y’s points, so no
points are lost. On the far right, you will see the Total Points to X and Y after X’s transfer and
after your allocation of the 40 points. This is only an Example, and you can change your answer
later.
Suppose Person X transfers
+1 (or -1) points to Y

Points after
X’s transfer
X
Y

I allocate
this amount
to Person X

Total points
X
Y

Multiple Choices by Person Z
Since Person X’s transfer is not yet available, you need to make multiple choices: you decide
how many of the additional 40 points to allocate to X for each possible transfer Person X can
make to Person Y. That is, your decision is to choose allocations to X from the 40 points
assuming X makes transfers to Y of –L points, -L+1 points, -L+2 points, etc. Later, when X’s
choice about how much to transfer to Person Y is available, it will be matched with your
corresponding choice about the allocation of the additional 40 points. The final bonus payments
to X and Y are based on their Endowments adjusted for X’s transfer plus the points you allocate
in your corresponding choice.
When you have understood these instructions, click “Continue” below to proceed to the quiz
about these instructions.

Quiz about Further Instructions
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We now need to make sure that you have understood these further instructions. Please carefully
select one answer to each of the three questions below. You have at most two chances to answer
all questions correctly, or your participation will be terminated. When you are satisfied with your
answers, click “Submit” below.
Question 1
Which of the following statements is true?
A. Any of the 40 points Person Z does not allocate to Person X are lost.
B. The payments of Persons X and Y will be based on a randomly chosen allocation of
Person Z.
C. Person Z makes multiple choices: Z chooses how many of 40 additional points to allocate
to Person X for each possible transfer Person X can make to Y.
Question 2
Which of the following statements is true?
A. The maximum number of points any Person X can possibly receive after Person X’s
transfer and Person Z’s allocation is 50 points.
B. At the time Person X chooses a transfer to Person Y, Person X does not yet know about
the existence of Person Z or about the 40 additional points.
C. When choosing an allocation of the 40 points, Person Z knows which transfer Person X
chose.
Question 3
Which of the following statements is true?
A. At the end of the experiment, Person Y’s final bonus payment is based onan endowment
of 5 adjusted for any transfers chosen by Person X plus any points received from Person
Z’s allocation.
B. Person Z chooses how much to transfer between Persons X and Y from their initial
endowments of 15 and 5.
C. Person X chooses how to allocate 40 additional points between X and Y.

Decision of Person Z
Remember that Person X may:
(the following appears only where negative transfers are possible, where L is the most negative
number)
• Transfer 1 to L points from Y to X.
• That is, Person X may choose a negative transfer to Y of –1 to –L points.
(in some cases, only 1 negative point can be transferred rather than a range of points, in which
case above it reads “Transfer 1 point from Y to X”)
OR
(the following appears where zero transfers are possible in combination with positive and/or
negative transfers.)
• Leave the points of X and Y unchanged.
• That is, Person X may choose a transfer to Y of 0 points.
OR
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(the following appears only where positive transfers are possible, where H is the highest positive
number)
• Transfer 1 to H points from X to Y.
• That is, Person X may choose a positive transfer to Y of +1 to +H points.
For each possible transfer by Person X, you may try out different values from 0 to 40 to allocate
to X from the pull-down menu in the field below marked “Choose.” This amount will be added
to Person X’s points, and the remaining amount from the 40 points will be added to Person Y’s
points. You may revise any choices at any time before submitting them. Once you are satisfied
with all choices, click on “Submit final decisions” at the bottom.
Suppose Person X transfers
–L (or 0 or +1) points to Y

Points after
X’s transfer
X
Y

I allocate
this amount
to Person X

−5 (or –L or 0 or +1) 20

0

−4 (or whatever)

19

1

Choose

−3 (or whatever)

18

2

Choose

Total points
X
Y

Choose

(etc.)}

[<Additional Allocation
Persons Z
In addition to Persons X and Y, other participants have been randomly assigned to a third group
consisting of participants called Persons Z. Each Person Z is randomly matched with a Pair
consisting of one Person X and one Person Y.
Z Payment
For making a decision about X and Y, each Person Z receives a fixed bonus, which has nothing
to do with the eventual payments received by Persons X and Y.
Decision of Person Z
Each Person Z allocates 40 additional points between Persons X and Y. These 40 points will be
added to the amounts X and Y receive after the transfer you (Person X) made from the initial
endowments, which total 20 points (15 to X and 5 to Y). Person Z is told the amount Person X
transferred to Person Y and then allocates an amount out of the 40 additional points to Person X.
Any remaining points out of the 40 that Z does not allocate to Person X goes to Person Y, so no
points are lost.
Final Payments
The final bonus payments to X and Y are based on their Endowments adjusted for X’s transfer
plus the points Person Z allocates to them.>]
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(Benevolent Dictator Treatments

continues below with Instructions for Person <X> [Y] {Z})
[<Persons Z
In addition to Persons X and Y, other participants have been randomly assigned to a third group
consisting of participants called Persons Z. Each Person Z was randomly matched with a Pair
consisting of one Person X and one Person Y.
Z Payment
For making a decision about X and Y, each Person Z received a fixed bonus, which had nothing
to do with the eventual payments received by Persons X and Y.>]
Decision of Person Z
[<The decision of Person Z was>] {As Person Z, your decision is} to choose how many points to
transfer between Persons X and Y. [(As Person)] <X> [Y][<, you make no decision. Specifically,
Z may>] {Persons X and Y make no decisions. Specifically, you may}:
(the following appears where negative transfers are possible, where L is the most negative
number)
• Transfer 1 to L points from Y to X.
• That is, [<Z>] {you} may choose a negative transfer to Y of –1 to –L points.
(in some cases, only 1 negative point can be transferred rather than a range of points, in which
case above it reads “Transfer 1 point from Y to X”)
OR
(the following appears where zero transfers are possible)
• Leave the points of X and Y unchanged.
• That is, [<Z>] {you} may choose a transfer to Y of 0 points.
OR
(the following appears where positive transfers are possible, where H is the highest positive
number)
• Transfer 1 to H points from X to Y.
• That is, [<Z>] {you} may choose a positive transfer to Y of +1 to +H points.
When you have understood these instructions, click “Continue” below to proceed to the quiz
about these instructions.

Quiz about Instructions
(same as for the Double dictator treatment)
[<Person X’s>] {Your} Decision
[<Below you can see a summary of the Endowments, the transfer chosen by Person Z, and the
Points after transfer.>]
{Here again are the transfers you may choose for your decision. You may:
• Transfer 1 to L points from Y to X.
• That is, you may choose a negative transfer to Y of –1 to –L points.
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OR
OR

•
•

Leave the points of X and Y unchanged.
That is, you may choose a transfer to Y of 0 points.

•
•

Transfer 1 to H points from X to Y.
That is, you may choose a positive transfer to Y of +1 to +H points.

Click on a number in the pull-down menu below in the field marked “Choose” to try out
different values for your transfer. Below this, the Points after transfer will update for Persons X
and Y. You may revise your choice at any time before submitting it. Once you are satisfied with
your choice, click “Submit” below.}
Person X
15

Endowments

Person Y
5

[<Person Z transferred>] {I transfer}this amount
Points after transfer

Questions and Payment
Thank you for your participation in this study. Your payment is
$
To receive this payment, please complete the questions below. Your responses will never be
associated with you personally. When you have completed all questions, click “Proceed to get
code” below.
1. Age in years
_______
2. Race: please choose the category that best describes your racial/ethnic background
1 African-American (non-Hispanic)
2 Asian-American/Pacific-Islander
3 Caucasian (non-Hispanic)
4 Hispanic/Latino
5 Native-American (Indian, Eskimo, Hawaiian)
6 Mixed Race
3. Gender
1 Male
2 Female
4. Marital status
1 Married
2 Widowed
3 Divorced
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4 Separated
5 Never married
5. Highest level of education or degree completed
1 Less than high school degree
2 High school degree or equivalent
3 Some college but no degree
4 Associate degree
5 Bachelor degree
6 Graduate degree
6. Employment status
1 Employed, working 40 or more hours per week
2 Employed, working 1-39 hours per week
3 Not employed, looking for work
4 Not employed, NOT looking for work
5 Retired
6 Unable to work
7. Total annual income of all members of your household in US dollars. Please enter without commas:
$_________ per year

(For Z in the Benevolent Dictator treatments and X in the Double Dictator treatments)
{<8. Why did you choose the transfer of points between X and Y as you did?>}
(For Z in the Double Dictator treatments)
{8. Why did you choose to allocate the 40 points as you did?}
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